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ABSTRACT 
 
Information security has been a particularly hot topic since the enhanced internal control 
requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) were introduced in 2002.  At about this same time, cloud 
computing started its explosive growth.  Outsourcing of mission-critical functions has always 
been a gamble for managers, but the advantages of cloud computing are too tempting to ignore.  
However, the move to cloud computing could prove very costly for a business if the 
implementation were to fail.  When making the decision to outsource critical functions, 
managers look to accountants to provide assurance that their data and transactions will be secure 
and that emergency procedures will be in-place and work as designed, to protect the business 
from any potential losses due to unforeseen events. 
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 70 has provided guidance to auditors of third-
party service organizations since 1992, but was replaced in April 2010 by Statement on 
Standards for Attestation Engagements (SSAE) 16.  And yet, data breaches continue to occur, 
costing billions of dollars annually. 
This research used data from the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC) database and, 
through frequency analysis, Chi-square and cluster analysis techniques, found statistically 
significant differences in the frequency of breaches experienced by various types of consumer 
organizations based on breach and organization type.  This result will be useful to auditors.  The 
research also conducted a survey of 67,749 IT manager/directors.  The responses to this survey 
were to be analyzed using binary logistic regressions and Chi-square tests.  Unfortunately, due to 
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severe limitations in the response rate and further complicated by the number of incomplete 
responses, no inferences can be drawn regarding factors relevant to decision-makers when 
contemplating the movement of critical business functions into the cloud environment. 
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Chapter I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Responsibility for information assurance, and therefore the requirement for expertise in 
the area, has always been a part of the accountant’s domain due to the critical nature of the 
information underlying the accuracy and reliability of the financial statements.  Historically, the 
focus has always been limited to financial information and the underlying data.  However, with 
the increase in use of the internet to not only transmit data, but to also process and store it, users 
have begun to expect much more from the assurance offered by auditors of service provider 
organizations.  Accountants have been involved with computers since they were first introduced 
and have continued to expand their level of responsibility as computerized systems have grown 
more powerful and their use more widespread.  However, since the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley act in 2002, which required enhanced internal control reporting requirements by 
management and expression of an opinion by external auditors on an internal control report, the 
expectations for the level of assurance have increased dramatically.  This “raising of the bar” is 
evidenced by the enhanced requirements placed on an auditor as written directly into the 
legislation.    
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As a concept, Cloud Computing has been around since the early 1960s, but the majority 
of its transition from concept to practice has occurred within the past decade.  This coincides 
with the increased level of accountants’ responsibility for providing assurance on information 
above and beyond the financial arena, which was partially driven by users’ persistence in relying 
on audit reports to represent assurance beyond that which was intended.  Cloud computing 
involves moving business-critical data and processing to location(s) external to the company’s 
own computer hardware.  These external storage locations and processing capacities are typically 
obtained from third-party “service providers”.  Outsourcing of mission-critical functions will 
always involve risks, and cloud computing is certainly no exception.  But the efficiencies that 
can be obtained through the use of cloud computing technologies are being confirmed as factual 
versus speculative and should not be disregarded – to do so in today’s super-competitive global 
environment may lead to missed opportunities.  Still, managers must remember that the move to 
cloud computing is fraught with complications that could prove disastrous for a business if even 
a single implementation were to fail.  A major consideration for all managers is the security of 
the data once it is in the cloud.  There is still a lot of doubt in this area, due to the ever-present 
and growing incidence of data breaches.  In his New York Times small-business guide on moving 
to the cloud, David Freedman quotes sources as saying “A lot of my older clients don’t want any 
of their data in the cloud” and “They’re very nervous about it.”  Another source, Mike 
Leatherwood of a barbecue restaurant chain states that he “is an enthusiastic user of Google 
Apps, but he agrees that confidential data should be kept out of the cloud. ‘We keep financial 
and H.R. data on our servers here,’ he said.”  Mr. Freedman advises, “The bottom line: If you do 
not like the idea of trusting anyone but yourself to keep your data safe, the cloud may take you 
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out of your comfort zone.”  (Freedman, 2011).  Consequently, when making the decision to 
outsource critical functions, business managers naturally look to accountants to provide 
assurance that their data and transactions will be secure, and that emergency procedures will be 
in-place and work as designed, to protect the business from any potential losses due to 
unforeseen events.  The early guidance on providing assurance services to third-party service 
providers was fairly limited with regard to any focus other than financial.  In order to properly 
analyze the impact of Information Assurance on Cloud Computing, it is appropriate to first 
define what is meant by each of these terms. 
According to the U.S. National Information Assurance Glossary, Information Assurance 
refers to offering “measures that protect and defend information and information systems by 
ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation.  These 
measures include providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, 
detection, and reaction capabilities.” (Committee on National Security Systems, 2010). 
For purposes of this study, the term Cloud Computing will be limited in meaning to the 
description provided by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which 
defines Cloud Computing as:  
A model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of 
configurable computing resources – for example networks, servers, storage, 
applications and services, that can be rapidly provisioned and released with 
minimal management effort or service provider interaction (Badger, Grance, Patt-
Corner, & Voas, 2011). 
Cloud Computing allows users to access technology-based services from the network cloud 
without knowledge of, expertise with, or control over the technology infrastructure that supports 
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them. This cloud model is composed of five essential characteristics (on-demand self-service, 
ubiquitous network access, location independent resource pooling, rapid elasticity, and measured 
service); three service delivery models (Cloud Software as a Service [SaaS], Cloud Platform as a 
Service [PaaS], and Cloud Infrastructure as a Service [IaaS]); and four models for enterprise 
access (Private cloud, Community cloud, Public cloud, and Hybrid cloud).  Both the user's data 
and essential security services may reside in and be managed within the network cloud (Richard 
Kissel, 2011).  All model components are described in further detail in chapter II. 
 
Historical Overview 
 
 
Information Assurance 
Early Guidance 
Consideration of an entity’s internal control goes back to the very first Statement on 
Auditing Procedure (SAP) issued in 1939.  However, guidance that specifically addressed the 
effects of Electronic Data Processing (EDP) on the auditor’s study and evaluation of internal 
control was not introduced until 1974, with the release of Statement on Auditing Standards 
(SAS) No. 3.   Even with this shift in focus, this pronouncement was not specific to service 
organizations, but applied to EDP functions in general.  The first guidance issued to specifically 
address the impact of the internal control system of a third-party service organization was SAS 
No. 44, issued in December of 1982.  This was soon followed by SAS No. 48 in July of 1984, 
titled “The Effects of Computer Processing on the Audit of Financial Statements.  Over the next 
several years, outsourcing of many business functions became commonplace.  Consequently, the 
regulatory authorities acknowledged the need to provide guidance that would specifically 
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address the evaluation of the internal control structure of third-party service providers. This was 
achieved by the issuance of SAS No. 70, titled “Service Organizations”.  
SAS70 
Since its creation in 1992 by the AICPA, Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 70 has 
provided guidance to auditors of third-party service organizations when conducting audits to 
provide such assurance on the internal control structure of the service organization.  SAS70 is 
designed to enable an independent auditor to evaluate and issue an opinion on a service 
organization's controls. It does not specify a pre-determined set of control objectives or control 
activities that service organizations must achieve – i.e., it is not a "checklist" audit.  It does, 
however, enable an independent auditor ("service auditor") to issue an opinion on a service 
organization's controls through a Service Auditor's Report.  There are two types of Service 
Auditor's Reports: Type I and Type II.  A Type I report only describes the service organization's 
description of controls at a specific point in time (e.g. December 31, 2010).  Alternatively, a 
Type II report also includes detailed testing of the service organization's controls over a 
minimum six-month period (e.g. July 1, 2010 to December 31, 2010).  So the complete service 
auditor's report contains the auditor's opinion, a description of the controls placed in operation, 
and if the report is a Type II, a description of the auditor's tests of operating effectiveness. The 
audit report can then be shared with the service organization's customers ("user organizations") 
and their respective auditors ("user auditors"), eliminating the need for audits of controls of the 
service organization by the auditors of each client organization. 
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) 
On July 30, 2002, Congress passed the “Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002”, which had a major 
impact on the responsibility for and reporting on internal control within a business.  Section 404 
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specifically requires management to prepare a report asserting that they have examined their 
“internal control over financial reporting” structure and have implemented the appropriate 
controls to assure the accuracy of the financial information.  The section further stipulates that 
the external auditor of the organization’s financial statements must also perform an examination 
of the internal controls (IC) of the company and express an opinion on management’s IC 
statement.  According to an article written by Christopher L. Schellman, co-founder of SAS70 
Solutions, “Many public companies, as part of their respective efforts to achieve compliance under 
Section 404, discovered that certain financial reporting controls that they relied upon were actually 
maintained by outsourced third-party service providers.” (Schellman 2005)   That is to say, to be 
considered compliant a company must verify that its service provider’s controls, in addition to its 
own, are effective (Bell III, 2010). 
 
Cloud Computing 
Cloud computing is not actually as new a concept as many people would believe, since 
the general idea behind it dates back to the 1960s.  However, the idea saw little movement 
toward practical implementation for the next several decades.  In the early 1990s, an idea called 
“grid computing” became popular.  This was a concept named for its intent to make computer 
power as easy to access as an electric power grid, and it is grid computing that is credited for 
leading to the current cloud computing paradigm.  
The origin of the term “cloud computing” is uncertain, but many attribute it to the 
diagrams of clouds used to represent the internet in journals and textbooks. The concept was 
developed by telecommunications companies who made a radical shift in their processing 
methodology.  By optimizing resource utilization through load balancing, they could get their 
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work done more efficiently and inexpensively.  One of the earliest major players in cloud 
computing was Salesforce.com, which in 1999 introduced the concept of delivering enterprise 
applications via a website. Amazon quickly followed, launching Amazon Web Service in 2002. 
When Google Docs joined the movement in 2006, cloud computing really began its rapid 
increase in popularity.  Also in 2006 Amazon introduced “Elastic Compute cloud” (EC2), as a 
commercial web service that allowed small companies and individuals to rent computers on 
which to run their own applications.  The year 2007 saw the implementation of an industry-wide 
collaboration between Google, IBM and a number of universities across the United States. This 
was followed in 2008 by Eucalyptus, which was the first open source platform for deploying 
private clouds, and OpenNebula, the first open source software for deploying private and hybrid 
clouds.  Microsoft finally got in the game in 2009, with the launch of Windows Azure in 
November of that year.  Since 2009, Oracle, Dell, Fujitsu, Teradata, HP, and many other well-
known technology companies have introduced their own cloud-based service divisions. 
 
Recent Events 
 
SSAE16 
Following the introduction of SAS70 in 1992, there was little change in the guidance for 
service provider auditors until April of 2010, when it was replaced by Statement on Standards for 
Attestation Engagements (SSAE) 16.  This new guideline was designed to more closely align 
U.S. policy with the International Standard on Assurance Engagements (ISAE) 3402, which was 
released in December of 2009. 
  
8 
 
Statement on Standards for Attestation Engagements (SSAE) No. 16, Reporting on 
Controls at a Service Organization, was issued by the Auditing Standards Board of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) in April 2010, and effectively replaces SAS70 
as the standard for reporting on service organizations.  It has a mandatory effective date of June 
15, 2011.  SSAE16 was drafted and issued with the intention and purpose of updating the US 
service organization reporting standard so that it mirrors and complies with the new international 
service organization reporting standard.   The new standard is an attest standard and not an audit 
standard.  Consequently, it will require management to provide the service auditor a written 
assertion about the fair presentation of the description of the service organization’s system, the 
suitability of the design of the controls and, in the case of a Type II report, the operational 
effectiveness of the control.  This is a substantial departure from the guidance provided under 
SAS70. 
 
ISAE3402 
International Standards for Assurance Engagements (ISAE) No. 3402, Assurance Reports 
on Controls at a Service Organization, was issued in December 2009 by the International 
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB).  Like SSAE16, it has a mandatory effective 
date of June 15, 2011.  ISAE3402 was developed to provide an international assurance standard 
for allowing public accountants to issue a report for use by user organizations and their auditors 
(user auditors) on the controls at a service organization that are likely to impact or be a part of 
the user organization’s system of internal control over financial reporting  (ISAE3402.com, 
2011). 
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AICPA Service Organization Control (SOC) Reports 
SSAE16 and ISAE3402 were drafted in part to prevent SAS70 audits from being misused 
to imply assurance on non-financial aspects (compliance and operations) of the internal control 
structure of a service organization.  To help CPAs examine the controls and to help management 
understand the related risks, the AICPA has established three Service Organization Control 
(SOC) reports (SOC 1, SOC 2 and SOC 3).   
SOC 1 engagements are performed in accordance with SSAE16.  They focus solely on 
controls at a service organization that are likely to be relevant to an audit of a user entity’s 
financial statements.  SOC 2 and SOC 3 engagements address controls at the service 
organization that relate to operations and compliance, such as data security, availability, 
processing integrity and online privacy.  These are the only report types that provide assurance 
specific to a third-party provider’s data and processing security, yet they are neither mandatory 
nor are they official regulation. 
 
Motivation 
 
 
In spite of the best efforts of auditors and regulators, however, there still seem to be some 
inadequacies in the system designed to assure data security.  This is evidenced by the fact that 
breaches of purportedly secure and safe data systems continue to occur.  Many researchers 
believe that the logical first step in resolving such an issue is to clearly define the current state of 
affairs.  Wallace, et al. opine “Establishing baseline knowledge of the current state of 
organizational controls is essential to achieving the ultimate goal of developing and testing a 
model linking IT controls to SOX compliance success.”  (Wallace, Lin, & Cefaratti, 2011)  
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Consequently, this research will attempt to identify areas where data breaches are most prevalent 
in an attempt to identify sections within the information assurance services arena that could be 
strengthened.  This will aid in the battle against potential future data breaches, because specific 
identification of areas of vulnerability will lead to development of improved and/or enhanced 
assurance procedures that may decrease the likelihood of data breaches, thereby enhancing the 
value of information assurance services.  Also, inefficiencies in the current system can be 
eliminated by providing auditors with specific guidance on where best to focus their energies. 
 
Research Purpose and Questions 
 
 
It should be noted that a major assumption underlying this research is that the proportion 
of reported breaches to actual breaches does not change.  There is no evidence found that would 
suggest that the ratio of reported to unreported breaches would change, and it is a necessary 
assumption to this research when examining trends. 
 
Purpose:  To empirically establish that experienced breach frequency varies significantly 
between various pairings of breach type and organization type.  This information 
may greatly assist auditors in the risk assessment portion of their engagement 
planning, as the engagement activities can be focused on addressing those breach 
events more likely to occur, based on organization type.  An additional objective 
is to empirically determine if SAS70/SSAE16/SOC audit services affect the 
decisions of Chief Information Officers (CIOs) regarding their consideration of 
whether or not to employ cloud/datacenter-hosted solutions and examine their 
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level of awareness regarding the different assurance levels offered by these 
various third-party service provider audit reports.  
The objective of this research is to answer the following questions: 
1. Are there any significant anomalies in reported breach data that could be used to 
benefit auditors? 
2. If type of organization is significantly associated with type of breach, which 
organization types are most vulnerable to which types of breaches? 
3. Do any of the following influence CIOs when making outsourcing (cloud) decisions?  
 
Prior breach experience 
Level of importance placed on audit certification 
Level of personal knowledge of assurance levels 
 
Research Design and Methodology 
 
 
 The research design will be two-fold.  The first portion of the study will utilize available 
data on the frequency and type of data breaches experienced by various types of organizations.  
This data will be analyzed using standard statistical analysis techniques, such as frequency 
analysis, cluster analysis and Chi-squared statistics to address research questions one and two.  
The second part of the study will utilize data obtained from a survey that was administered via 
email to 67,749 IT directors throughout the U.S.  This data will also be analyzed using multiple 
statistical analysis techniques, including binomial logistic regression and Chi-squared analysis, to 
address research question three. 
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Sample 
The data for the first part of this study were obtained from the Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse (PRC) database
1
.  Privacy Rights Clearinghouse purports to be a nationally 
recognized consumer education and advocacy nonprofit dedicated to protecting the privacy of 
American consumers.  The organization’s employees compile information on reported data 
breaches from a multitude of sources, including the Open Security Foundation list-serve, 
Databreaches.net, PHI Privacy and NAID.  Personal Health Information Privacy (PHI Privacy) is 
a database that compiles only medical data breaches.  Many of these are obtained from the US 
Department of Health and Human Services' medical data breach list.  National Association for 
Information Destruction, Inc (NAID) provides monthly newsletters that include a number of data 
breaches largely due to improper document destruction.  Data for the PRC database has been 
collected since April of 2005, but actually includes data for breaches starting in January of 2005.  
The database is updated every two days.  The breaches posted into this database are limited to 
those occurring within the United States and specifically do not include incidents in other 
countries.  By PRCs own admission, it is not a complete listing of breaches.  The list is a useful 
indication of the types of breaches that occur, the categories of entities that experience breaches, 
and the size of such breaches.  But the list is not a comprehensive listing.  Reported incidents 
affecting more than nine individuals from an identifiable entity are included.  Breaches affecting 
nine or fewer individuals are included if there is a compelling reason to alert consumers.  Most of 
the information is derived from the Open Security Foundation listserv, which is in turn derived 
from verifiable media stories, government web sites/pages, or blog posts with information 
pertinent to the breach in question.  If a breached entity has failed to notify its customers or a 
government agency of a breach, then it is unlikely that the breach will be reported anywhere 
                                               
1 Used with the permission of the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, www.privacyrights.org. 
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(PRC-FAQ, 2012).  But many breaches are reported as a result of state requirements that 
individuals be notified in the event that their personal data has been breached.  The catalyst for 
reporting data breaches to the affected individuals has been the California law that requires 
notice of security breaches, implemented in July of 2003.  Since then, more than 40 states have 
passed laws requiring that individuals be notified of security breaches.  For the period under 
investigation, a total of 2,847 breaches were reported.  This data will be predominantly analyzed 
on a monthly basis. 
The data for the second part of the study comes from a survey that was emailed to 67,749 
IT directors at various educational, for-profit, governmental, medical, and non-profit 
organizations located throughout the United States.  The survey participants were selected based 
on their inclusion in a database of IT directors employed in these various organization types and 
ostensibly employed at the appropriate level to answer the survey questions.  This database was 
purchased from SpecialDatabases.com, and has the following characteristics: 
Primary Email - 100% Fill Ratio 
Contact Title - 100% Fill Ratio 
First Name - 100% Fill Ratio 
Last Name - 100% Fill Ratio 
Company Name - 100% Fill Ratio 
Address - 100% Fill Ratio 
City - 100% Fill Ratio 
State - 100% Fill Ratio 
Zip Code - 100% Fill Ratio 
Phone - 100% Fill Ratio 
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Fax Number 
SIC Code - 100% Fill Ratio 
NAICS Code - Industry - 100% Filling Ratio 
Website Address - 100% Filling Ratio 
Statistical analysis of the survey responses was used to address research question three.  Specific 
procedures conducted are described in greater detail below. 
 
Importance of the Research 
 
 
 In the current ultra-competitive, global business environment, the question for most 
managers is when to make the move to the cloud, not if.  Growth of the cloud computing 
industry, as measured by revenues, has been substantial over the past decade and all projections 
are that the level of growth will not only continue, but will accelerate.  In order to garner a share 
of this potential market, third-party service providers need to overcome the main concerns of 
consumers.  In recent years, security has consistently been reported as the #1 concern, as 
reported in numerous surveys and frequently proclaimed in the popular media outlets.  
Consequently, for those providers that can effectively negate this concern, growth seems all but 
certain.  This research is important because it will provide information that auditors of third-
party cloud service providers can use during their audits to bolster the security aspect of their 
work as it pertains to data breaches.  This will aid the auditing profession, because as more 
consumers gain a comfort level and place greater reliance on the work of auditors, more work 
will become available through the growth of the cloud computing industry.  This should evolve 
as a result of hesitant consumers overcoming their fears and choosing to embrace the technology. 
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Theory 
 
 
The concept under investigation here is that of outsourcing of computerized functions and 
the attempts to manage the inherent risks associated with that activity.  There are numerous 
theories that support the outsourcing decision.  In one of the more comprehensive recent studies, 
Gottschalk & Solli-Sæther (2006) examine critical issues at various stages of maturity in the 
outsourcing relationship.  They conclude that at the beginning of an outsourcing engagement, a 
Cost Stage occurs, which is grounded in Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and agency theory.  
After several years of having outsourcing, the focus of the outsourcer shifts into the Resource 
Stage, where resource based view (RBV) and core competences are the most important 
explanatory theories.  At the end, the stage of Partnership may occur, when relational view, 
social exchange, and the stakeholders theories become more explanatory (Gottschalk & Solli-
Sæther, 2006).  
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) has been the most used theory of outsourcing 
(Perunovic & Pedersen, 2007).  A transaction cost is a cost incurred in making an economic 
exchange.  Many studies have concluded that due to economies of scale, service vendors have a 
clear cost advantage.  Consequently, outsourcing of computer storage and data processing 
functions (cloud computing) has become an almost required component for many businesses to 
remain competitive in today’s global markets.  Some authors suggest that it is cost prohibitive to 
prevent breaches at all levels, but many companies are willing to accept the risk anyway because 
the realized benefits outweigh the potential cost.  The current research’s goal of reducing the 
effective cost of cloud computing, by enhancing audit efficiencies, would lend further support to 
organizations opting to outsource based on this theory. 
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Agency theory is a consideration in the outsourcing decision due to the nature of the 
arrangement – i.e., transferring of responsibility from the company to its agent (cloud service 
provider).  Concerns generated by the agency problem (moral hazards and adverse selection) can 
be resolved by monitoring and bonding (Clegg, Hardy, & Nord, 1996).  What makes this part of 
the outsourcing arrangement particularly difficult is that transfer of the responsibility for 
processing and storage of data does not transfer the fiduciary responsibility of the consumer 
company to those from which the data emanated. 
The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm theory holds that  firms possess resources, a 
subset of which enable them to achieve competitive advantage, and a subset of those that lead to 
superior long-term performance.  The resource-based view in outsourcing builds from a 
proposition that an organization that lacks valuable, rare, inimitable and organized resources and 
capabilities, shall seek for an external provider in order to overcome that weakness (Wernerfelt, 
1984).   
The concept of core competences is built on the resource-based theory.  The concept 
originally supported keeping all of the business critical processes “in-house”.  It was based on 
the idea that core competencies were the “collective learning” of the organization and that 
knowledge base was to be coveted.  Interestingly, it is now applied to outsourcing because the 
outsource vendor’s competences are assumed to be incorporated into the consumer organization 
competencies.  It is now considered one of the most important factors that influence success of 
an outsourcing arrangement (Feeny, Lacity, & Willcocks, 2005).  Assuming the current research 
is able to identify audit efficiencies for third-party service providers, the level of reliance that 
consumers feel they can place on the security offered by third-party service providers will 
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increase.  This will, in turn, allow more consumer organizations to rely on this reasoning to 
justify their outsourcing decision. 
The relational view theory is closely related and tied to the RBV theory and to the 
concept of core competencies.  It is based on the premise that a firm’s critical resources may 
span firm boundaries and may be embedded in interfirm routines and processes (Dyer & Singh, 
1998).  Here again, this theory supports the decision to outsource critical functions as a means of 
gaining competitive advantage, when an organization does not have the necessary expertise in-
house. 
Social exchange theory is defined as “limited to actions that are contingent on rewarding 
reactions from others.  Implied is a two-sided, mutually contingent, and mutually rewarding 
process involving “transactions” or simply “exchange” (Emerson, 1976).  It addresses the utility 
of establishing mutually beneficial relationships, as cloud service providers and consumers are 
motivated to do.  In order to maintain the mutually beneficial nature of the relationship, service 
providers must ensure that they provide what the customer wants and needs – in this case, data 
security in the cloud. 
The stakeholder theory is a basis of outsourcing logic that is applicable to every business 
entity.  This theory argues that every person or other entity that participates in the operation of an 
organization does so in order to obtain benefits (Perunovic & Pedersen, 2007).  Cloud providers 
only participate in the relationship in order to sell their services.  Likewise, cloud consumers will 
only participate in the relationship if the perceived level of benefit (data security) matches their 
requirement. 
 The need to demonstrate adequate control of data and processing security is critical to all 
third-party “cloud” services providers – failure to do so will likely result in lost revenues.  Unless 
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a third-party provider can confirm assurance of the level of security required, consumer 
organizations will not be able to justify establishing a relationship based on any of these theories. 
 
Results 
 
 
 The results of the first research question indicate that anomalies do exist that may benefit 
auditors of third-party service providers.  A significant trend in breach patterns by month over 
time was identified.  It was also determined that significant trends do exist in the frequency of 
breaches by both breach type and by organization type.  The analysis of research question two 
further refined the relationship between breach types and organization types and provides the 
opportunity to make recommendations for specific focus areas based on organization type under 
audit.  This will prove quite valuable to auditors.  Research question three sought to identify 
factors that influence IT directors regarding prior breach experience and their willingness to 
continue to outsource key business functions.  There were some observations noted in the 
frequency analysis of the survey data that may prove interesting and/or useful for future research. 
Unfortunately, due to a severely limited response rate, statistical verification of suspected 
relationships was not possible.  It also sought to determine if the level of certification of auditor 
services as relates to third-party service providers is or is not important to the IT managers of 
consumer entities.  Again, data limitations precluded this testing.  Finally, the question remains 
unanswered as to whether managers claiming an understanding of the differences between 
SAS70/SSAE16/SOC and SOC type 2 & 3 reports are more or less likely to rely on those higher-
level assurances when making their outsourcing decisions. 
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Contributions of the Research 
 
 
Assuming existing vulnerabilities to data breaches as identified by this project are 
addressed through future audit guidance, this research will benefit: 1) CPA firms that provide 
Information Assurance services to third-party service provider organizations, as they will have 
better guidance and can plan and conduct their audit services more efficiently and effectively, 2) 
third-party service provider companies (those that consume SAS70/SSAE16/SOC audit 
services), as they may reduce their breach frequency, which will enhance their image and their 
audits may be more efficient and therefore less costly,  3) CPA firms that audit cloud consumer 
organizations, because they can place more reliance in the work of the service organization 
auditor, and finally, 4) the cloud services consumer organizations themselves, as they may 
experience lower audit fees through efficiencies recognized in 3) above.  All of this may also 
promote enhanced trust in cloud systems and therefore, growth of the industry.  The ultimate 
contribution of this research will be that it will provide additional tools to regulators and 
auditors, which they can use in the fight against the ever-growing problems associated with data 
breaches – i.e., identity theft, financial fraud, etc.  These events are extremely expensive; not 
only to individuals, but to society in general, as the economic losses experienced by businesses 
are ultimately passed through to consumers.   Governmental agencies will also benefit from 
enhanced audit procedures.  So too will taxpayers, since the costs of losses experienced by 
governmental organizations are borne by society either through reductions in services or the 
additional tax dollars necessary to compensate for the economic losses due to breaches.  Finally, 
educational institutions also stand to gain considerably from this research, as they too are 
frequent victims of data breaches and suffer the associated economic penalties. 
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Limitations of the Research 
 
 
 All empirical studies suffer from certain limitations and this one is no exception.  Using 
data from past periods is a good method of generalizing what has occurred and identifying 
trends.  It does not, however, predict the future.  The best that research can hope for is to draw 
reasonable conclusions as to what the future may hold.  Another limitation is in the data itself.  
The data from the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse has limitations imposed by the manner in which 
it is accumulated.  For example, there are likely to be breaches that go unreported and are 
therefore not included in the current analyses.  It is possible that some of these may even be 
significant.  This study is also limited to breaches reported in the U. S. and may not be 
generalizable to populations taken from other geographic regions or combinations thereof.  The 
second portion of the research relied on a survey instrument administered via email.  Survey 
instruments have inherent limitations due to their very nature.  One of the most notable of these 
is non-response bias.  Non-response bias refers to the mistake one expects to make in estimating 
a population characteristic based on a sample of survey data in which, due to non-response, 
certain types of survey respondents are under-represented (Berg, 2005).   Another survey 
limitation is that the questions must be general enough to be appropriate for all respondents and 
may therefore not elicit a response that could prove useful to the research.  Finally, the survey 
portion of this particular research is severely limited by a dismal response rate.  Statistical 
analysis of the data proved meaningless and no inferences can be made based on the survey 
results. 
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Organization of the Dissertation 
 
 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows:  Chapter II presents a review 
of the previous literature outlining the history of Information Assurance as it pertains to third-
party service providers.  It also includes a history of Cloud Computing (outsourcing), an 
examination of the pertinent data breach information, and a review of the literature that 
specifically addresses Information Assurance issues in cloud computing.  Chapter III summarizes 
the methodology to be employed to test the hypotheses, including a list of significant variables 
utilized, and a description of the tests to be conducted.  Chapter IV explains the results of the 
analyses performed, and Chapter V outlines the conclusions of the research, its limitations, and 
suggestions for future research.  
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Chapter II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
History of Service Provider Assurance 
 
 
Early Guidance 
Consideration of an entity’s internal control goes back to the very first Statement on 
Auditing Procedure (SAP) issued in 1939.  The level of importance placed on the issue was 
raised with the release of SAP No. 29 in 1958, which further delineated the scope of the auditor’s 
review of internal control.  As the use of computerized processing became more prevalent, 
updated pronouncements had to be released to address the issues raised.  The first official 
pronouncement to specifically address the effects of Electronic Data Processing (EDP) on the 
auditor’s study and evaluation of internal control was SAS No. 3, which was released in 
December of 1974.   This pronouncement was not specific to service organizations, but 
applicable to all EDP functions that impacted the financial statements of the organization under 
audit.  
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The first guidance issued to specifically address the impact of the internal control system of a 
third-party service organization was Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 44, issued in 
December of 1982.  It provided guidance on preparation of “Special-Purpose Reports on Internal 
Accounting Control at Service Organizations”.  This was soon followed by SAS No. 48 in July 
of 1984, titled “The Effects of Computer Processing on the Audit of Financial Statements.  Over 
the next several years, outsourcing of many business functions, including some that had a 
substantial impact on the financial statements, became commonplace.  Consequently, the 
regulatory authorities acknowledged the need to provide guidance that would specifically 
address the evaluation of the internal control structure of third-party service providers. This was 
achieved by the issuance of SAS No. 70, titled “Service Organizations”, which was the first 
attempt at combining the requirements of internal control of third-party service providers, 
computerized processing and financial reporting into one regulation. 
 
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 70 
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 70, Service Organizations, is a widely 
recognized auditing standard developed in 1992 by the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA).  SAS70 is generally applicable when an independent auditor ("user 
auditor") is planning the financial statement audit of an entity ("user organization") that obtains 
services from another organization ("service organization").  Service organizations that impact a 
user organization's system of internal controls could be application service providers, bank trust 
departments, claims processing centers, data centers, third-party administrators, or other data 
processing service bureaus.  If a service organization provides transaction processing, data 
hosting, IT infrastructure, or other data processing services to the user organization, the user 
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auditor may need to gain an understanding of the controls at the service organization in order to 
properly plan the audit and evaluate control risk (SAS70.com, 2011). 
An auditor's examination performed in accordance with SAS No. 70, commonly referred 
to as a "SAS70 Audit", represents that a service organization has been through an in-depth audit 
of its control objectives and control activities, which often include controls over information 
technology and related processes. The service organization is responsible for describing its 
control objectives and control activities that would be of interest to user organizations and the 
respective user auditors.  In order to entice businesses to consume cloud service offerings, 
service providers must demonstrate that they have adequate controls and safeguards when they 
host or process data belonging to their customers. The requirements of Section 404 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 makes service auditor reports even more important to the process of 
reporting on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting.   
SAS70 was created to help auditors specifically address the internal controls of a service 
organization as they pertain to the financial statements.  Unfortunately, it is written in such a 
manner as to allow substantial interpretation because it does not specify any pre-determined of 
control objectives or control activities that must be met in order for a service organization to 
“pass”.  This flexibility has been abused in the past to imply more assurance on the IC of the 
service organization than what might actually exist.  While SAS70 does provide an auditor the 
opportunity to issue an opinion on a service organization's controls through a Service Auditor's 
Report, the reports are limited to only two types: Type I and Type II.  A Type I report only 
describes the service organization's description of controls at a specific point in time (e.g. 
December 31, 2010).  Alternatively, a Type II report also includes detailed testing of the service 
organization's controls over a minimum six-month period (e.g. July 1, 2010 to December 31, 
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2010).  So the complete service auditor's report contains the auditor's opinion, a description of 
the controls placed in operation, and if the report is a Type II, a description of the auditor's tests 
of operating effectiveness. The audit report can then be shared with the service organization's 
customers ("user organizations") and their respective auditors ("user auditors"), eliminating the 
need for audits of controls of the service organization by the auditors of each client organization.  
Regardless of which report is issued, it still only addresses those controls that might have a 
material effect on the financial statements. 
In other words, in a Type I report, the service auditor will express an opinion and report 
on the subject matter provided by the management of the service organization as to (1) whether 
the service organization's description of its system fairly presents the service 
organization's system that was designed and implemented as of a specific date; and (2) whether 
the controls related to the control objectives stated in management's description of the service 
organization's system were suitably designed to achieve those control objectives – also as of a 
specified date. 
In a Type II report, the service auditor will express an opinion and report on the subject 
matter provided by the management of the service organization as to (1) whether the service 
organization's description of its system fairly presents the service organization's system that was 
designed and implemented throughout the specified period; (2) whether the controls related to 
the control objectives stated in management's description of the service organization's system 
were suitably designed throughout the specified period to achieve those control objectives; and 
(3) whether the controls related to the control objectives stated in management's description of 
the service organization's system operated effectively throughout the specified period to achieve 
those control objectives (Reehl, 2011). 
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One of the major limitations to SAS70 is that it was specifically targeted toward 
providing assurance for financial reporting purposes.  Unfortunately, as the need for other types 
of assurance (compliance and operational) grew, many service providers began misrepresenting 
the scope and level of assurance provided by their SAS70 compliance.  SAS70 audits were not 
designed for nor are they appropriate for meeting assurance needs over many cloud offerings in 
the areas of infrastructure, platform, or software as a service.  Recently, the topics of Business 
Continuity and Disaster Recovery have taken on increased significance as customer 
organizations attempt to understand how capable their service provider is of handling a business 
interruption.  The increasing sophistication of computer viruses and events such as the 
catastrophe of September 11th, 2001, have demonstrated that organizations must have 
contingency plans in place to mitigate such risks.  Organizations that use a third-party service 
organization are now heavily vested in the adequacy of their service provider's business 
continuity and disaster recovery abilities.  Historically, service providers have included a control 
objective related to business continuity in their description of controls as part of the SAS70 audit. 
However, business continuity planning addresses how an organization mitigates future risks; it 
does not provide actual controls that give user auditors any assurance.  Because of this 
ambiguity, the AICPA has provided the following: 
"A service organization's plans related to business continuity and contingency 
planning generally is of interest to the management of user organizations. If a 
service organization wishes to describe its business continuity and contingency 
plans, such information may be included in Section Four (4), "Other Information 
Provided by the Service Organization." Because plans are not controls, a service 
organization should not include in its description of controls (Section Two of the 
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report) a control objective that addresses business continuity or contingency 
planning."  (AICPA, 2010).   
If a service organization wants to further advertise the adequacy of its business continuity 
activities, it should employ a Trust Services attestation engagement using the Trust 
Services Availability principle. 
 
Trust Services 
Trust Services are defined as a set of professional assurance and advisory services based 
on a common framework to address the risks and opportunities of IT. These principles provide 
guidance when offering assurance services, advisory services, or both on information technology 
(IT)-enabled systems.  This framework is particularly relevant when providing services with 
respect to security, availability, processing integrity, privacy, and confidentiality (AICPA, 2012).  
Trust Services Principles and Criteria are: 
Security –  The system is protected against unauthorized access (both 
physical and logical). 
 
Availability –  The system is available for operation and use as committed 
or agreed. 
 
Processing Integrity – System processing is complete, accurate, timely, and 
authorized. 
 
Online Privacy –  Personal information obtained as a result of e-commerce is 
collected, used, disclosed, and retained as committed or 
agreed. 
Confidentiality –  Information designated as confidential is protected as 
committed or agreed. 
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SysTrust 
SysTrust is the AICPA’s early attempt to address the limitations in the SAS70 audit 
framework and offer an alternative approach.  SysTrust is a specific service model jointly 
developed by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and the Canadian 
Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA).  A SysTrust engagement allows public accounting 
firms and practitioners to provide assurance on the reliability of a system using any of the Trust 
Services Principles and Criteria.  It is designed to increase the comfort of management, 
customers, and business partners with systems that support a business or particular activity. In a 
SysTrust engagement, the practitioner evaluates and tests whether a specific system is reliable 
when measured against three essential principles: availability, security, and integrity.   
At the completion of a SysTrust engagement, the practitioner renders an opinion on 
management's assertion (or the actual subject matter) that effective controls were maintained to 
provide reasonable assurance that the SysTrust principles were achieved. The practitioner can 
report on all four SysTrust principles or each principle separately.  Because the SysTrust 
principles and criteria are established and available to any user, the practitioner's report does not 
have to be restricted to specific parties.  Consequently, the resulting Trust Services report can be 
distributed to a much wider audience, which means it can provide additional value to the service 
organization.  Trust Services help address issues that SAS70, SSAE16 and ISAE3402 are not 
designed to cover. 
Another common criticism of SAS70 audits is that the service organization defines the 
objectives of the audit, leading some to question the validity of the audit from the onset.  Scott 
Crawford, research director at Enterprise Management Associates (EMA) and former 
information security officer for the International Data Centre of the Comprehensive Nuclear-
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Test-Ban Treaty Organization in Vienna, Austria phrases it as “A SAS70 audit is conducted 
according to objectives defined by the service organization for itself.  In other words, SAS70 is 
not itself a framework of objectives, but rather allows the organization to choose its objectives -- 
which begs the question of ‘audited to what?’” (Brenner, Data Protection, 2010).  A better 
approach, at least in eyes of many critics of SAS70, is to perform service organization audits 
based on some pre-defined list of criteria rather than only audit those controls that management 
identifies.  In this manner, audit services would be seen as offering substantially more value and 
the audit reports would become more consistent between third-party service providers.  
Numerous lists of control risks exist upon which to base this type of examination, such as ISO 
27001/27002 (from the Greek word isos, meaning equal) and COBIT (Control OBjectives for 
Information and related Technology). 
The ISO 27001/27002 standard has over 150 predefined controls.  Auditors can use the 
list to identify all the controls that should apply to the situation at hand and then implement 
procedures to test those controls.  This methodology prevents management from only providing 
assurance on those controls that they know are in place and operating properly.  COBIT, first 
released in 1996 by the Information System Audit and Control Association (ISACA), is an IT 
governance framework that helps managers reconcile control requirements, technical issues and 
business risks.  It enables clear policy development and good practice for IT control throughout 
organizations, and emphasizes regulatory compliance.   CobIT has proven so popular that a new 
release (COBIT 5) is scheduled for release later in 2012.  Sadly, the newest guidance, Statement 
on Standards for Attestation Engagements No. 16, does not incorporate either of these guidelines 
and does little to address the issue of only affirming what management asserts.  Management is 
not likely to request assurance reports on controls that they know are weak or missing. 
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Statement on Standards for Attestation Engagements (SSAE) No. 16 
Statement on Standards for Attestation Engagements (SSAE) No. 16, Reporting on 
Controls at a Service Organization, was issued by the Auditing Standards Board of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) in April, 2010.  SSAE16 effectively replaces 
SAS70 as the standard for reporting on service organizations with an effective date of June 15, 
2011.  SSAE16 was issued with the intention of updating the US service organization reporting 
standard so that it mirrors and complies with the new international service organization reporting 
standard ISAE3402.  There are many similarities between SAS70 and SSAE16.  For example, 
the scope still focuses on controls relevant to internal controls over financial reporting, and the 
auditor’s report will still be restrictive in nature.  Some critics indicate that the new regulation 
will be just a rehash of the old one.  In the opinion of Chris Schellman, President of SAS70 
Solutions, Inc., “We may actually be entering a boom period for "SAS70 v2.0" (in the form of 
SSAE16 and ISAE3402).  Most differences between SAS70 and the new standards will be 
almost indistinguishable to the average layperson” (Brenner, Data Protection, 2010).  The key 
differences noted between SAS70 and SSAE16 are: 1) the newer regulation requires that the 
report contain a written assertion in the body of the report about the fair presentation of the 
description of the service organization's system, the suitability of the design of the controls and, 
for Type 2 reports, the operating effectiveness of the controls (because SSAE16 is an Attestation 
standard, whereas SAS70 was an Audit standard), and 2) SSAE16 prohibits the use of prior 
evidence.
2
 
So it would appear that the new regulation has primarily focused on shifting the 
responsibility for the control activity back to management of the service provider organization, 
                                               
2
 SAS70 allowed auditors to use evidence gathered in prior audits in support of the current examination.  SSAE16 
specifically disallows this practice. 
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rather than enhancing the audit process itself.  It seems that the importance of strengthening 
internal controls and the tests of those controls has again been lost in the shuffle.  It is also noted 
that this guidance still leaves unfulfilled the need to provide assurance on “other than financial” 
processes, specifically the data handling and storage processes.  Fortunately, the AICPA has 
provided direction in these other areas through the issuance of Service Organization Control 
Reports (SOC) guidelines. 
 
AICPA Service Organization Control (SOC) Reports 
As previously noted, one of the presumed motivations behind the drafting of SSAE16 and 
ISAE3402 was to prevent SAS70 audits from being misused to imply assurance on non-financial 
aspects (compliance and operations) of the internal control structure of a service organization.  
But SSAE16 fell short of addressing these other areas.  To remedy the SSAE16 limitations in 
this respect, the Assurance and Advisory Services section of the AICPA has created three 
Service Organization Control (SOC) reports to help fill the gap. 
SOC 1 engagements are performed in accordance with SSAE16.  They focus solely on 
controls at a service organization that are likely to be relevant to an audit of a user entity’s 
financial statements.  The two types of SOC 1 reports are similar to the two SAS70 reports, the 
difference being that the auditor’s reports now report on “management’s description” of the 
system of internal controls and suitability to achieve the specified control objectives.  Type 1 
reports are still as of a specific date and type 2 reports are still for a specific period of time.  
Distribution of these reports is restricted to existing user entities.  An example would be: An 
employee benefit plan uses a bank trust department to invest and service the plan’s assets. When 
the employee benefit plan’s financial statements are audited, the plan’s auditor needs information 
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about the plan’s internal control over financial reporting, including controls at the bank trust 
department that affect the employee benefit plan’s financial statements. The plan’s auditor can 
obtain that information from an SOC type 2 report, which provides the service auditor’s opinion 
on whether the controls were operating effectively at the bank and describes tests of the controls 
performed by the service auditor to form that opinion and the results of those tests. 
SOC 2 guidance is designed to assist CPAs in reporting on the effectiveness of a service 
organization’s controls related to operations and compliance.  This new guide combines the Trust 
Services criteria (related to security, availability, processing integrity, confidentially or privacy) 
with the reporting detail provided by SSAE16 to help service organizations provide their user 
entities with the information their auditors need.  Both type 1 and type 2 reports may be issued 
for SOC 2 engagements.  Type 1 reports provide a description of the service organization’s 
system, with type 2 reports also including a description of the tests performed and the results of 
those tests.  Because of the detailed description of tests performed, distribution of this report is 
limited to user organizations.  An example of an application of this type would be:  A Cloud 
Service Organization that offers virtualized computing environments or services for user entities 
wishes to assure its customers that the service organization maintains the confidentiality of its 
customers’ information in a secure manner and that the information will be available when it is 
needed.  A SOC 2 report addressing security, availability and confidentiality provides user 
entities with a description of the service organization’s system and the controls that help achieve 
those objectives. 
SOC 3 engagements are similar to SOC 2 engagements.  Both use the predefined criteria 
in Trust Services Principles, Criteria and Illustrations and both address controls at the service 
organization that relate to operations and compliance.  The big difference is that the SOC 3 
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report does not contain the detailed description of tests performed and the results of those tests.  
Consequently, distribution of the SOC 3 report is not limited.  This makes this level of service 
particularly attractive to companies that share information with other business partners as part of 
their operations, but want to assure the public at large that their personal data is kept secure and 
confidential.  For example, a large online retailer may establish an affiliates program that permits 
small retailers to use the transaction processing systems of the online retailer.  Because of the 
concern that many customers of the small retailers may have regarding the online retailer’s 
collection and use of purchase information, the online retailer and the small retailers wish to 
assure customers that the online retailer maintains the privacy of customers’ information. 
Management of the online retailer may request a SOC 3 engagement, performed by a CPA over 
the system of processing using the Trust Services Principles and Criteria, and may then distribute 
the SOC 3 report to customers via a link on its website and publicly display the SOC 3 Report: 
SysTrust for Service Organizations seal. 
Interestingly, although SSAEs are issued by the AICPA, management thereof chose not 
to address many of the data security issues within SSAE16.  Instead they chose to separately 
draft and publish the SOC engagement guidelines.  This facilitates the continued existence of a 
strong divergence between international and domestic service organization assurance, at least in 
practice.   Presently, a large contingent still exists that believes that not enough is being done to 
stem the tide.  An article published as recently as January 2012 states that “Audit standards have 
not yet developed to the point where there is clear-cut guidance to external auditors regarding 
how and what to test in a client’s operations when these depend on a cloud service provider.  The 
SOC standards only provide general guidance regarding the reliance of an external auditor on the 
attestation service provided by another independent accountant regarding a cloud provider’s 
  
34 
 
assertions on selected aspects of their systems and operations” (Nicolaou, Nicolaou, & Nicolaou, 
2012). 
 
History of Cloud Computing 
 
 
The concept of Cloud Computing was first introduced in the early 1960s, but the 
popularity of this internet paradigm has only blossomed within the past decade or so.  
Consequently, the bulk of the history is fairly recent.  First a discussion of what constitutes cloud 
computing. 
NIST defines cloud computing by describing five essential characteristics, three cloud 
service models, and four cloud deployment models. They are: 
 
 Essential Characteristics: 1) Broad Network Access 
     2) Rapid Elasticity 
     3) Measured Service 
     4) On-Demand Self-Service 
     5) Resource Pooling 
 
 Service Models  1) SaaS 
     2) PaaS 
     3) IaaS 
 
 Deployment Models:  1) Public 
     2) Private 
     3) Hybrid 
     4) Community 
 
Essential Characteristics of Cloud Computing 
Cloud services exhibit five essential characteristics that demonstrate their relation to, and 
differences from, traditional computing approaches: 
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Broad network access:  Capabilities are available over the network and accessed 
through standard mechanisms that promote use by heterogeneous thin or thick client 
platforms (e.g., mobile phones, laptops, and PDAs) as well as other traditional or cloud-
based software services. 
Rapid elasticity:  Capabilities can be rapidly and elastically provisioned — in some 
cases automatically — to quickly scale out; and rapidly released to quickly scale in. To 
the consumer, the capabilities available for provisioning often appear to be unlimited and 
can be purchased in any quantity at any time. 
Measured service:  Cloud systems automatically control and optimize resource usage by 
leveraging a metering capability at some level of abstraction appropriate to the type of 
service (e.g., storage, processing, bandwidth, or active user accounts). Resource usage 
can be monitored, controlled, and reported — providing transparency for both the 
provider and consumer of the service. 
On-demand self-service:  A consumer can unilaterally provision computing capabilities, 
such as server time and network storage as needed automatically, without requiring 
human interaction with a service provider. 
Resource pooling:  The provider’s computing resources are pooled to serve multiple 
consumers using a multi-tenant model, with different physical and virtual resources 
dynamically assigned and reassigned according to consumer demand. There is a degree 
of location independence in that the customer generally has no control or knowledge over 
the exact location of the provided resources, but may be able to specify location at a 
higher level of abstraction (e.g., country, state, or datacenter). Examples of resources 
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include storage, processing, memory, network bandwidth, and virtual machines. Even 
private clouds tend to pool resources between different parts of the same organization. 
 
Cloud Service Models 
Cloud service delivery is divided among three archetypal models and various derivative 
combinations. The three fundamental classifications are often referred to as the “SPI Model,” 
where ‘SPI’ refers to Software, Platform, or Infrastructure (as a Service).  These three 
components are defined as: 
Cloud Software as a Service (SaaS):  The capability provided to the consumer is to use 
the provider’s applications running on a cloud infrastructure. The applications are 
accessible from various client devices through a thin client interface such as a web 
browser (e.g., web-based email). The consumer does not manage or control the 
underlying cloud infrastructure including network, servers, operating systems, storage, or 
even individual application capabilities, with the possible exception of limited user 
specific application configuration settings. 
Cloud Platform as a Service (PaaS):  The capability provided to the consumer is to 
deploy onto the cloud infrastructure consumer-created or acquired applications created 
using programming languages and tools supported by the provider. The consumer does 
not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure including network, servers, 
operating systems, or storage, but has control over the deployed applications and possibly 
application hosting environment configurations. 
Cloud Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS):  The capability provided to the consumer is 
to provision processing, storage, networks, and other fundamental computing resources 
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where the consumer is able to deploy and run arbitrary software, which can include 
operating systems and applications. The consumer does not manage or control the 
underlying cloud infrastructure but has control over operating systems, storage, deployed 
applications, and possibly limited control of select networking components (e.g., host 
firewalls). 
Although exact usage numbers reported vary somewhat, it is clear that all three 
cloud service models are experiencing strong growth.  In their April 26, 2011 blog, 
DataTrendsPublications reports that “SaaS adoption is up 13 points over last year, to 60 
percent” (DataTrendsPublications, 2011).  Estimates for PaaS usage are currently 
somewhat nebulous, as best indicated by comments from Kamesh Pemmaraju of the Sand 
Hill Group.  In his August 27, 2011 article “Let the Cloud Wars Begin: Who Will Be the 
Winners?”, he states that “enterprise use of PaaS will be in its infancy” and that “Sand 
Hill’s latest survey results bear this out: a whopping 40 percent of the respondents stated 
that they don’t plan to use PaaS now or in the next 12 months” (Pemmaraju, 2011).  This 
would indicate that 60% are, in fact using PaaS currently.  Finally, in its report "Is IaaS 
Moving Beyond Just Cloud Fluff?", Yankee Group found that 24 percent of large 
enterprises with cloud experience are already using IaaS, and another 37 percent expect 
to adopt IaaS within the next 24 months (Hickey, 2010). 
While multi-tenancy is not specified as an essential cloud characteristic by NIST, it is frequently 
discussed as such and it is therefore appropriate to include it here. 
Multi-Tenancy:  Multi-tenancy in cloud service models implies a need for policy-driven 
enforcement, segmentation, isolation, governance, service levels, and chargeback/billing 
models for different consumer constituencies.  Consumers might utilize a public cloud 
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provider’s service offerings or actually be from the same organization, such as different 
business units rather than distinct organizational entities, but would still share 
infrastructure.  From a provider’s perspective, multi-tenancy suggests an architectural and 
design approach to enable economies of scale, availability, management, segmentation, 
isolation, and operational efficiency; leveraging shared infrastructure, data, metadata, 
services, and applications across many different consumers.  Multi-tenancy can also take 
on different definitions depending upon the cloud service model of the provider; 
inasmuch as it may entail enabling the capabilities described above at the infrastructure, 
database, or application levels. An example would be the difference between an IaaS and 
SaaS multi-tenant implementation.  Cloud deployment models place different importance 
on multi-tenancy.  However, even in the case of a private cloud, a single organization 
may have a multitude of third party consultants and contractors, as well as a desire for a 
high degree of logical separation between business units. Thus multi-tenancy concerns 
should always be considered (Brunette & Mogull, 2011). 
 
Cloud Deployment Models 
 Service model notwithstanding, cloud services are typically deployed via one of four 
models.  These are: 
Public Cloud:  The cloud infrastructure is made available to the general public or a large 
industry group and is owned by an organization selling cloud services. 
Private Cloud:  The cloud infrastructure is operated solely for a single organization. It 
may be managed by the organization or a third party, and may exist on-premises or off- 
premises. 
  
39 
 
Community Cloud:  The cloud infrastructure is shared by several organizations and 
supports a specific community that has shared concerns (e.g., mission, security 
requirements, policy, or compliance considerations). It may be managed by the 
organizations or a third party and may exist on-premises or off-premises.  For example, 
all government organizations within a particular state may share computing infrastructure 
on the cloud relating to the citizens residing in that state.  Another good example would 
be a group of medical facilities within a specific geographical region sharing computer 
infrastructure, as they all utilize the same patient-tracking software and must all meet the 
same HIPAA requirements. 
Hybrid Cloud:  The cloud infrastructure is a composition of two or more clouds (private, 
community, or public) that remain unique entities but are bound together by standardized 
or proprietary technology that enables data and application portability (e.g., cloud 
bursting for load-balancing between clouds). 
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Figure 1 provides an overview of the various components of the cloud computing environment, 
as it is currently defined. 
 
Figure 1 - Cloud Computing Environment
3
 
 
Pros and Cons 
The potential benefits of cloud computing are touted throughout the popular media and 
most people would have difficulty refuting the majority of the claims.  Some of the more popular 
benefits are:  quick implementation, anytime/anywhere access, lower upfront costs, little or no 
hardware or maintenance costs, reduced support costs, easier upgrades, disaster recovery and 
                                               
3 Created by Sasa Stephanovic 
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backup capabilities, etc. (DeFelice & Leon, 2010).  But the cloud is not all gain and no pain.  
While the cloud offers all these advantages, until some of the risks are better understood, many 
of the major players will be tempted to hold back (Viega, 2009).  Managers are fully aware that 
they are held responsible for the security and regulation of the data within their realm of 
influence, regardless of where it is located or who has physical control.  They also understand 
that they have a fiduciary duty to protect not only the data that belongs to their company, but also 
the data obtained from outside parties as well.  The PRC notes that it is virtually impossible for 
individuals to protect themselves from a data breach and that it is up to organizations that collect 
data on consumers to take the steps to ensure the privacy and security of the data they collect and 
maintain. 
According to a recent IDC survey, 87.5% of IT executives and CIOs cited security as the 
top challenge in their adoption of the cloud services model, as compared to 74% in the prior year 
(Gens, 2009).  This indicates that there is still a fairly strong concern among potential adopters 
regarding the security of the data that is placed in the cloud, and evidence suggests that some 
companies are still hesitant to participate.  Seamus Reilly, director of IT risk advisory at Ernst & 
Young states “One of the perceived inhibitors in the uptake of cloud computing, particularly into 
the delivery of enterprise systems, is a need for assurance that there are controls operating to 
protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data and of their systems.  Currently, 
recognized assurance standards do not fully address the wider requirements that cloud services 
bring.” (Reilly, IT Management, 2011).  In addition to the general security issues labeled 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of data, IT directors must specifically be concerned with 
answers to questions such as: 
1. Do the vendor’s employees look at my data while storing and processing it? 
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2. Can I view access logs and audit trails of all users and vendor employees to confirm 
no improper access is occurring? 
3. Is my data truly safe from being co-mingled with someone else’s data (if multi-
tenancy is being utilized)? 
4. Is my data always encrypted so that I’m protected even in the event of a data breach? 
5. Are all of my compliance requirements being met?  This is a particularly sticky 
problem because transfer of the “control” of the data and processing does not transfer 
the “responsibility” for regulatory compliance. 
6. What happens if my third-party service provider is purchased by another company – 
perhaps my competitor?   What happens if they go bankrupt? 
This is not meant to be a comprehensive list of security issues facing IT directors – it is 
merely a sampling of the issues that must be addressed.  However, based on just this brief list, is 
it any wonder that these IT professionals are leery of entrusting their company’s future (and their 
own) to the cloud?  Much of the current sentiment may best be expressed by Nicolaou et al., who 
state “It is currently unknown how providers will be able to protect data from theft and 
manipulation; therefore, organizations are only willing to place non-critical applications and 
general data in the cloud.” (Nicolaou, Nicolaou, & Nicolaou, 2012) 
Still, there are those that would disagree.  In a recent write-up on the Cloud Connect 2011 
conference, Graham states “Security in the cloud has been a hot topic, but concerns seem to be 
waning as evidenced by the limited keynote and general session discussion focused on this issue” 
(Graham, 2011).  She further opines that initial apprehensions about security, vendor lock-in, and 
data privacy are subsiding and new debates, such as public versus private/hybrid deployment, are 
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taking center stage.  Still others point to the seemingly phenomenal revenue growth of the cloud 
industry as evidence that security issues are no longer a problem. 
 
Growth 
 Analysts find that across industry, online collaboration and enterprise applications such 
as customer relationship management, supply chain management and enterprise resource 
planning drive the growth of cloud computing, and estimate that within the next five years, the 
global market for cloud computing will grow to $95 billion and that 12% of the worldwide 
software market will move to the cloud in that period (Subashini & Kavitha, 2011).  A recent 
report by research firm Forrester estimates that the cloud computing market will leap from $41 
billion in 2011 to more than $241 billion in 2020 with an annual growth rate of over 20%.  Most 
of this growth is projected for the SaaS market, which is estimated to grow to $93 billion by 
2016 and to $133 billion by 2020.  Another major research firm, Gartner, estimates the cloud 
services market will exceed $148 billion as early as 2014.  With its latest survey, Gartner 
received responses from 2,014 CIOs representing more than $160 billion in CIO IT spending and 
covering 38 industries across 50 countries.  The survey found that only 3% of CIOs today have 
more than half of their infrastructure and applications operating in the cloud. But that number is 
expected to grow to 46% by 2015, making cloud transformation the hallmark of many CIOs at 
their current companies, and accounting for the phenomenal growth projected.   Even the federal 
government is taking the plunge.  The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) predicts that of 
the current $80 billion federal IT spending, $20 billion can potentially move to the cloud. 
 Prudent IT managers are risk averse when it comes to gambling the future of their 
companies and their careers.  They look for assurance in order to mitigate potential risks before 
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making any major moves, and typically rely upon auditors to provide that assurance.  
Consequently, this is a perfect opportunity for auditors to maximize their contribution to the 
cloud computing movement.  Gary Reiner, long-time CIO of General Electric was recently 
quoted as saying “As to any lingering security concerns, GE takes our security very, very 
seriously. We would never put virtual data outside the firewall unless it was secure.”  When 
asked how he knows for sure that GE's supplier data is secure outside his firewall, he says, 
somewhat ominously: "Audits." (Wailgum, 2009).  The fact that his company spends $55 billion 
per year among its supplier base and that he has outsourced this function entirely, speaks 
volumes about the level of trust that he has in his third-party service organization and the 
assurance provided through them.  But the most revealing part of his statement is the last word 
“Audits”.  Apparently, his trust is based primarily on the work of the third-party service provider 
auditors.  If this is the level of faith being placed in the work of these auditors, it is incumbent 
upon all involved in the process to be worthy of such trust and respect. 
But if auditors are doing such a good job of providing assurance on the security of data 
placed in the cloud these days, why is it that the number of data breaches continues to grow?  If 
the guidance from SAS70, SSAE16, ISAE3402, and SOCs has proven so effective that 
companies are entrusting billions of dollars to the cloud based on that assurance, why are data 
stored in the cloud compromised on a daily basis?  These are the questions that really must be 
addressed. 
 
Recent Breach History 
 
 
It was introduced earlier that cloud computing has actually been in existence since the 
1960s, yet there is little history in the literature on breaches prior to the past decade or so.  This 
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reality has several likely explanations.  Development of the cloud much beyond the novelty stage 
only occurred during the past decade, so by virtue of a smaller presence in the past there would 
have been fewer breaches than experienced in more recent years.  It is also possible that the 
breaches that did occur were simply not reported because current regulatory and societal 
pressures did not exist to encourage reporting of such events.  It has typically been the view of 
managers that such things indicate weaknesses in the organization and should be kept quiet, lest 
the organization be somehow penalized for allowing such an occurrence. 
In more recent years, there has been a substantial increase in breaches reported.  The data 
used for this study from the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse provides the following descriptive 
data for the study period (2005 through 2011), which is provided in Table 1.  Note that although 
observations date back to January 2005, the PRC did not start compiling this data until April 
2005.  Consequently, data from the first quarter of 2005 may be underreported. 
 
 
Table 1 - PRC Descriptive Data 
 
Number of Number of
Year Breaches Records
2005 136 52,821,610
2006 482 48,607,177
2007 452 129,974,978
2008 355 49,659,422
2009 253 218,903,225
2010 605 12,341,682
2011 564 30,760,879
Totals 2,847 543,068,973
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Although this reported number of breached records (> 543 million) may seem staggering 
for a relatively scant number of years, the director of the PRC, Beth Givens, says that this 
number is conservative.  She continues "We generally learn about breaches that garner media 
attention.  Unfortunately, many do not.  And, because many states do not require companies to 
report data breaches to a central clearinghouse, data breaches occur that we never hear about.  
Our Chronology is only a sampling." (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2011)  Some of the more 
noteworthy 2011 breaches reported that are attributable to web-based exposure are: 
1. Sony PlayStation (April 27) – Sony discovered an external intrusion on PlayStation 
Network (PSN) and its Qriocity music service on or about April 19th.  Sony blocked 
users from playing online games or accessing services like Netflix and Hulu Plus on 
April 22nd.  The blockage lasted for seven days.  Sony believes criminal hacker(s) 
obtained names, addresses, email addresses, dates of birth, PSN/Qriocity password and 
login, and online IDs for multiple users.  The attacker may have also stolen users' 
purchase history, billing address, and password security questions.  Over the course of 
the next several months, Sony discovered that the hackers gained access to 101.6 
million records, including 12 million unencrypted credit card numbers.  This breach 
highlights the importance of password hygiene.  Passwords are frequently the only 
thing protecting our private information from prying eyes.  Many websites that store 
your personal information (for example web mail, photo or document storage sites, 
and money management sites) require just a user name and password for protection.  
Password-protected web sites are becoming more vulnerable because often people use 
the same passwords on numerous sites.  One study by Sophos, a security firm, found 
that more than 30% of users recycle the same password for every site that they access.   
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In this case, the stolen passwords were unencrypted, meaning the criminal could 
potentially "break in" to other sites if the victims used the same password more than 
once. 
2. Epsilon (April 2) – Epsilon, an email service provider for companies, reported a 
breach that affected approximately 75 client companies.  Email addresses and 
customer names were affected.  Epsilon has not disclosed the names of the companies 
affected or the total number of names stolen.  However, millions of customers received 
notices from a growing list of companies, making this the largest security breach ever.   
Conservative estimates place the number of customer email addresses breached at 50 
to 60 million.  The number of customer emails exposed may have reached 250 million.   
Compromised email addresses and names may seem innocuous to some, but victims 
may fall prey to spear phishing.  Spear phishing occurs when a criminal sends an email 
that sounds and looks like it’s from a company the recipient has an account with 
because it addresses him or her by name.  A spear-phishing message might say, "Hello 
Mr. Anderson, Because of the recent hacking incident affecting some Acme 
customers, we are asking you to visit this website [URL provided] and update your 
security settings.”  The email tries to convince trusting readers to “bite” on the bait and 
go to that website, and then divulge other information like Social Security numbers 
and credit card numbers.  The result could be as serious as identity theft.  What makes 
this breach so significant is that it highlights the risk of cloud-based computing 
systems and the need for greater cloud security measures. 
3. Texas Comptroller's Office (April 11) – Information from three Texas agencies was 
discovered to be accessible on a public server.  Sometime between January and May of 
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2010, unencrypted data was transferred from the Teacher Retirement Center of Texas, 
the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) and the Employees Retirement System of 
Texas.  It ended up on a state-controlled public server as early as April of 2010 and 
was not discovered until March 31, 2011.  Sensitive information such as names, Social 
Security numbers, addresses, dates of birth and driver's license numbers could have 
been exposed.  A spokesperson from the Texas Comptroller's Office claims that the 
breach occurred because numerous procedures were not followed.  Some employees 
were fired for their roles in the incident.  Approximately two million of the 3.5 million 
individuals possibly affected were unemployed insurance claimants who may have had 
their names, Social Security numbers and mailing addresses exposed.  The birth dates 
and driver's license numbers of some of these people were also exposed.  Two class 
action lawsuits have been filed on behalf of the 3.5 million Texans affected by the 
breach.  One such lawsuit seeks a $1,000 statutory penalty for each individual, which 
would cost the state of Texas $3.5 billion if they lost and had to pay up.  This breach is 
particularly significant because individuals generally do not have a choice when 
providing personal information to a government agency. It is therefore vitally 
important that government agencies act as responsible stewards of personal data. 
This is merely a small sampling of electronic data breaches from the most recent year; enough 
additional data exists from just the past few years to fill numerous volumes.  But these few 
examples are sufficient to clearly indicate that the problem is serious and can easily get worse 
without intervention.   
 Further evidence of the magnitude of the breach problem is provided by the Ponemon 
Institute 2011 survey.  They surveyed 583 IT security practitioners in the U.S. with an average of 
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9.6 years of experience.  More than half are employed by organizations with over 5,000 
employees.  Some of their findings are:  
1. Organizations are experiencing multiple breaches.  More than half of respondents (59 
percent) say they have had two or more breaches in the past 12 months and 10 percent 
do not know.  Approximately 90 percent of organizations have had at least one 
breach.  
2. As a result of these multiple breaches, more than one-third (34 percent) of 
respondents say they have low confidence in the ability of their organization’s IT 
infrastructure to prevent a network security breach.  
3. Insufficient budgets are an issue for many organizations.  Fully 52 percent of 
respondents say 10 percent or less of their IT budget is dedicated to security alone.  
4. In the next 12 to 18 months, 47 percent say their organizations will increase the 
portion of their IT dollars spent on security to over half of their total IT budget.  
For purposes of the current study, one of the most telling results illuminated by the Ponemon 
survey is that “Security breaches most often occur at off-site locations but the origin is not often 
known.   Mobile devices and outsourcing to third parties or business partners seem to be putting 
organizations at the most risk for a security breach” (Ponemon Institute LLC, 2011).  In this 
portion of their survey, 28 percent say that breaches occurred remotely and 27 percent say it was 
at a third party or business partner location. 
 Another 2011 analysis provides even more onerous results.  Since the cloud concept was 
originally developed by the telephone companies, it is only appropriate that they still have a hand 
in moving it from concept to practice.  For the past several years, Verizon® has, in conjunction 
with the U.S. Secret Service, been producing a Data Breach Investigations Report.  The Verizon 
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2011 offering reveals some interesting statistics.  The report states that “We constantly see 
breaches involving hosted systems, outsourced management, rogue vendors, and even virtual 
machines, though the attack vectors have nothing to do with it being a virtual machine or not.  In 
other words, it’s more about giving up control of our assets and data and not controlling the 
associated risk, than any technology specific to The Cloud” (Baker, Hutton, Hylender, Pamula, 
Porter, & Spitler, 2011).  They report that half of the IT assets encountered during their 
investigation were fully or partly managed by a third party, and that overall, both hosting and 
management were a little more likely to be handled by external parties compared to prior years.  
Interestingly, they opine that the combination of outsourcing plus indifference and/or negligence 
with respect to vendor management—which is seen more often than people might think—is 
almost certainly a contributor (to the breach statistics).  Some of the more enlightening statistics 
that they assert include: 
1. 92% of data breaches stemmed from external agents (+22% from prior year) 
2. 50% involved some form of hacking (+10% from prior year) 
3. 92% of attacks were not highly difficult (+7% from prior year) 
4. 76% of all data was compromised from servers (-22% from prior year) 
5. 96% of all breaches were avoidable through simple or intermediate controls (no 
change from prior year) 
These results seem to provide substantiation to the premise that the problem continues to grow, 
despite current efforts to combat it.  And if the findings of this Verizon® report are to be 
believed, item 5 above indicates that the problem is largely preventable.  If this is truly the case, 
this current research should prove valuable to those who intend to try to stem the tide.  Whether 
fortunate or unfortunate, auditors are seen as the “information police” in the minds of most 
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educated individuals.  The opportunity to be a large part of the solution is already thrust upon 
them – auditors just have to be willing to make the leap from protecting themselves to protecting 
their clients through enhanced job performance. 
 
Cost of Breaches 
 
 
Data breaches cost billions annually – of this there is little doubt.  Although 
determination of a specific dollar figure is very difficult and estimates vary widely, nobody 
denies that it is a large and expensive problem.  Interest in this problem has become so prevalent 
in business today that Darwin Professional Underwriters Inc., a Farmington, CT-based 
technology liability insurance company, has released a free online calculator that it said allows 
businesses to estimate – with a fair degree of accuracy – their financial risk from data theft.  In 
his 2007 article in Computerworld magazine, Vijayan states: 
 “Darwin's Data Loss Cost Calculator uses proprietary algorithms developed with 
security breach data from media reports and other industry resources, according to 
the company.  Companies input data in the respective fields in the calculator to 
get instant estimates for costs associated with breach-related activities such as 
customer notification, credit monitoring, crisis management consulting, state or 
federal fines, and attorney fees.  The calculator does not include costs associated 
with any class-action or other lawsuits that might follow a data breach, he said. 
Neither does it look at the effect on stock prices or reputation, because such 
numbers can vary by incident and are much harder to generalize.” (Vijayan, 2007) 
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The financial consequences of a security breach can be severe. When asked to consider 
cash outlays, internal labor, overhead, revenue losses and other expenses related to the security 
breach, 41 percent of respondents reported that it was $500,000 or more and 16 percent said they 
were not able to determine the amount.  This estimate about the cost is consistent with two other 
studies Ponemon Institute conducts annually: the Cost of a Data Breach and the Cost of Cyber 
Crime. According to those findings, the average cost of one data breach for U.S. organizations 
participating in the 2010 study was $7.2 million and the average cost of one cyber attack for U.S. 
organizations participating in the 2010 study was $6.4 million (Ponemon Institute LLC, 2011). 
 
Cloud-specific Breach Issues 
 
 
Some readers might assume that all assurance services that fall under the SAS70, 
SSAE16, ISAE3402, and SOCs umbrella would be cloud-specific.  After all, these guidelines are 
all specific to audits of third-party service providers.  However, as has been illuminated in the 
previous sections, with the exception of SOC Type 2 and SOC Type 3 engagements, the primary 
focus of all this guidance is specific to controls over data used in financial reporting.  Yet much 
of the assurance that is sought by businesses in the current markets relates to concerns of a non-
financial nature.  Also, many arrangements still exist between providers and consumers of “off-
site processing and data storage” services that do not qualify as cloud computing.  Nevertheless, 
the bulk of what has been discussed thus far and in fact the bulk of what is currently being 
written in the literature about third-party service provider assurance concerns cloud computing. 
Providing security in the cloud presents some new challenges for many organizations.  
Current cloud offerings are essentially provided via public (as opposed to private) networks, 
which presumably expose them to more attacks.  There are also requirements for auditability that 
  
53 
 
must be met, to ensure compliance with legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 
Health and Human Services Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).  
These Acts establish security procedures that must be provided for in order to move corporate 
data to the cloud.  Some researchers believe that there are no fundamental obstacles to making a 
cloud-computing environment as secure as the vast majority of in-house IT environments, and 
that many of the obstacles can be overcome immediately with well-understood technologies such 
as encrypted storage, Virtual Local Area Networks, and network middleboxes (e.g. firewalls, 
packet filters).  For example, encrypting data before placing it in a Cloud may be even more 
secure than unencrypted data in a local data center.  This is one of the recommendations most 
frequently made by security professionals, but as indicated in the Verizon® paper (and others), 
seems to be grossly underutilized, which is surprising, since it is also one of the least expensive 
methods of achieving data security.  One scholarly offering is that auditability could be added as 
an additional layer beyond the reach of the virtualized guest OS (or virtualized application 
environment), providing facilities arguably more secure than those built into the applications 
themselves and centralizing the software responsibilities related to confidentiality and 
auditability into a single logical layer. Such a new feature reinforces the Cloud Computing 
perspective of changing the focus from specific hardware to the virtualized capabilities being 
provided (Armbrust, et al., 2009). 
Legal issues must also be considered by managers contemplating a move to the cloud.  
Many nations have laws requiring SaaS providers to keep customer data and copyrighted 
material physically housed within national boundaries.  But most companies would probably 
prefer not to have their data subject to the whims of the national political parties.  Few businesses 
would be happy with the ability of a country to get access to their data via the court system; for 
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example, a European customer might be concerned about using SaaS in the United States given 
the U. S. Patriot Act, which allows legal access to private data under certain circumstances.  The 
current trend among cloud service providers is to offer choices to consumers to alleviate these 
problems.  For example, Amazon provides services located physically in the United States and in 
Europe, allowing providers to keep data in whichever location they choose.  This gives 
businesses the ability to expand their consumption as their needs change.  If they desire new 
services in a new location, it can be accomplished with a simple configuration change, avoiding 
the need to find and negotiate with an overseas hosting provider. 
 One recently proposed cloud assurance service offering that may hold promise is the 
concept of “Risk Assessment as a Service”.  In their 2010 working paper, Kaliski and Pauley 
suggest that traditional assessments developed for conventional IT environments do not readily 
fit the dynamic nature of the cloud.  As an alternative, they propose a cloud-based assessment 
paradigm that would rely on an autonomic system that is reactive and proactive to its 
environment.  (Kaliski & Pauley, 2010).  Another recent study examines the information 
assurance practices of vendors based on their traffic volume, company size and service offerings 
(Chakraborty, Ramireddy, Raghu, & Rao, 2010).  In just the past few years several cloud 
computing initiatives have been established to address cloud information assurance practices.  
These include CloudAudit, the Cloud Security Alliance, the Open Cloud Manifesto, the World 
Privacy Forum’s Cloud Privacy Report, and Shared Assessments. 
CloudAudit is actually a tool, designed to provide a common interface and set of 
processes and technologies to enable cloud service providers to automate the collection and 
assertion of operational, security, audit, assessment, and assurance information.  Originally 
developed as the foundation of a stand-alone organization by C. Hoff of Cisco Systems, it was 
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incorporated into the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) in October of 2010 (Subramanian, 2010).   
According to their website, the CSA is “a not-for-profit organization with a mission to promote 
the use of best practices for providing security assurance within Cloud Computing, and to 
provide education on the uses of Cloud Computing to help secure all other forms of computing. 
The Cloud Security Alliance is led by a broad coalition of industry practitioners, corporations, 
associations and other key stakeholders.” (Cloud Security Alliance, 2011).  Formally established 
in December of 2008, this organization has grown quickly and now has members from most of 
the leading service providers in the cloud computing industry, as well as many of the larger 
consumer organizations.  In 2009, the Open Cloud Manifesto was released, and subsequently an 
organization grew out of it.  The manifesto itself is merely a stated list of core principles by 
which cloud services should be developed and offered for consumption.  There was much 
controversy surrounding the release of this document, as some of the larger players – i.e., Google 
and Microsoft, stated they were not allowed input into the document but were asked to sign in 
support of it.  To date, they have both declined.  The stated goal of this organization is to “ensure 
that organizations will have freedom of choice, flexibility, and openness as they take advantage 
of cloud computing.”  (Open Cloud Manifesto, 2011).  The underlying premise is to protect 
consumers – particularly the smaller and less powerful ones, from the industry giants who 
possess the ability to dominate the industry and dictate the rules of pricing and service levels.  
The World Privacy Forum, founded in 2003, has also joined the “consumer protection” 
proponents in the cloud computing arena.  In 2009 they released a report titled “Privacy in the 
Clouds: Risks to Privacy and Confidentiality from Cloud Computing”, that addresses the privacy 
rights that consumer organizations may unwittingly be ceding when opting to outsource some 
business functions (Gellman, 2011). 
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The surge in movement to the cloud environment also inspired the creation of 
organizations like Shared Assessments.  This organization’s focus is based on the perceived 
“need for a standardized and objective vendor management assessment methodology that would 
help outsourcers meet regulatory and risk management requirements while significantly reducing 
costs for all stakeholders.” (Shared Assessments, 2011)  This program was originally developed 
by Bank of America Corporation, The Bank of New York Mellon, Citi, JPMorgan Chase & 
Company, U.S. Bankcorp, and Wells Fargo & Company in collaboration with leading service 
providers and the Big 4 accounting firms, and was launched in 2006.  Consequently, its focus 
appears to be more consumer-side driven. 
Considering the growth in the formation of third-party service providers offering cloud 
services and the level of attention being attracted in the media by the “cloud phenomenon”, it is 
incumbent upon accounting academia to provide empirical research to investigate the adequacy 
of the current efforts being made to provide the desired level of assurance on the internal controls 
employed by these organizations.  It is the goal of this research to enhance that investigation by 
examining the impact that security-focused attest services provided to third-party service 
providers may or may not have, when measured by the incidence of data breaches.  This research 
also seeks to determine what factors influence the decisions made by IT directors and determine 
if they are relying on the right information to make those decisions. 
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Chapter III 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This research is designed to address the issue of data breaches, particularly as they are 
related to electronic activities.  It will empirically establish that a significant trend does exist in 
breach frequency over time.  It will also establish that the threat level posed by data breaches 
varies significantly by type of breach and type of organization, and will identify significant 
relationships between breach type(s) and organization type(s) to assist auditors in the risk 
assessment portion of their engagement planning.  An additional objective is to empirically 
determine if SAS70/SSAE16/SOC audit services and/or prior breach exposure affect the 
decisions of CIOs regarding their consideration of whether to employ cloud/datacenter-hosted 
solutions.  Also, it will determine if CIOs are educated in the different levels of IT certification 
to determine if the audit profession is providing sufficient education on the subject.  The 
following research questions have been developed to address these goals: 
1. Are there any significant anomalies in reported breach data that could be used to 
benefit auditors? 
2. If type of organization is significantly associated with type of breach, which 
organization types are most vulnerable to which types of breaches? 
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3. Do any of the following influence CIOs when making outsourcing (cloud) decisions?  
 
Prior breach experience 
Level of importance placed on audit certification 
Level of personal knowledge of assurance levels 
 
Research Design 
 
 
 Exporting key business data and processes into the cloud computing environment is 
rapidly becoming a business imperative.  In order to maintain a competitive edge, businesses 
must always try to, at a minimum, “keep up” with the competition.  But as the move into the 
cloud has gained momentum over the past decade, this data model has become the norm rather 
than the exception.  Cloud vendors and cloud consumers both extol the virtues and downplay the 
shortcomings.  The high current level of interest in the cloud benefits this research, as the topic is 
very popular and current.  Much is being written on the topic with new articles appearing almost 
daily, yet little of it is empirical in nature.  Most is published from an IT marketing perspective 
(and predominantly web-published), with little empirical support.  The intent of this study is to 
add validity to the current body of knowledge in this area through proper data selection and 
testing in order to confirm and/or refute some of the current claims and beliefs.  
The research will be performed in two separate phases.  The first phase of the study will 
utilize available data on the frequency and type of data breaches experienced by various types of 
organizations.  This data, taken from the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse website, will be analyzed 
using standard statistical analysis techniques, such as cluster analysis, frequency analysis and 
binomial logistic regression.  The second part of the study will utilize data obtained from a 
survey administered to 67,749 IT directors located throughout the U.S.  This data will also be 
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analyzed using multiple statistical analysis techniques, including Chi-squared tests and binomial 
logistic regression. 
 
Sample 
As noted above, the first part of this study will use data from the Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse database.  The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse is a non-profit organization that 
compiles information on reported data breaches from a multitude of sources.  This data has been 
collected since April of 2005 and is updated approximately every two days.  This data will be 
sorted in numerous ways so that the necessary comparisons can be made and statistical analyses 
performed in order to address the hypotheses.  The sample period under investigation, 2005 
through 2011, contains 2,847 breaches affecting 543,319,784 individual records.  The data were 
first analyzed for the purpose of providing guidance to auditors regarding the existence of any: 
seasonal component(s), overall frequency by breach type, overall frequency by organization 
type, and relationships between breach type by organization type.   
The types of data breaches to be investigated are constrained by the classification of the 
data in the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse database.  Consequently, analysis of breaches will be 
confined to the categories dictated by the data source.  Specific identification of all breach types 
and their respective descriptions are presented below. 
 
Variables 
Breach-type variables (Dichotomous) 
DISC – Unintended Disclosure:  Sensitive information posted publicly on a 
website, mishandled or sent to the wrong party 
via email, fax or mail. 
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HACK – Hacking or Malware:   Electronic entry by an outside party, malware 
and spyware. 
 
CARD – Payment Card Fraud:   Fraud involving debit and credit cards that is not 
accomplished via hacking.   For example, 
skimming devices at point-of-service terminals. 
 
INSD – Insider: Someone with legitimate access intentionally 
breaches information - such as an employee or 
contractor 
 
PHYS – Physical loss: Lost, discarded or stolen non-electronic records, 
such as paper documents 
 
PORT – Portable device:      Lost, discarded or stolen laptop, PDA, 
smartphone, portable memory device, CD, hard 
drive, data tape, etc. 
 
STAT – Stationary device:   Lost, discarded or stolen stationary electronic 
device such as a computer or server not designed 
for mobility 
 
UNKN – Unknown  
Other important categories related to data breaches also exist, for example: provider downtime, 
provider system crashes, data lost in cyberspace, and vendor lock-in, but they are not addressed 
in this research due to the unavailability of comprehensive and reliable data sources for these 
issues. 
 Also due to the constraints imposed by the data source, organization types will be limited 
to the following: 
Organization-type variables (Dichotomous) 
  BSO – Business, Other 
BSF – Business, Financial & Insurance 
BSR – Business, Retail/Merchant 
EDU – Educational Institutions 
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GOV – Government/Military 
MED – Medical/Healthcare Providers 
NGO – Nonprofit Organizations 
Additional variables necessary for and used in the analysis of the data set are: 
Other variables 
BRCH_TYP – Categorical variable that indicates breach type (1 through 8) 
MON_YR – Nominal variable that indicates the month/year of the breach 
ORG_TYP – Categorical variable that indicates organization type (1 through 7) 
All 2,847 breach incidents reported for the period under review were used in the analyses 
conducted for research questions 1 and 2. 
Research question 3 was addressed using the results of the email survey conducted.  The 
survey was sent to 67,749 IT directors at organizations throughout the U.S.  Unfortunately, the 
database used for this phase of the research proved to be less reliable than was anticipated.  Of 
the 67,749 emails transmitted, there were 23,624 that were returned as undeliverable, leaving an 
initial sample of 44,125 “delivered” surveys.  Sadly, only 203 responses were received, and 
many of them were only partially completed.  This represents a survey response rate of 
approximately ½ of 1 percent, after eliminating the undeliverable emails.  Variables established 
for the analysis of the survey are: 
AUD_PR_BRCH If prior breach was with an audited CSP, 1; otherwise 0 (also from 
survey questions 4a and 4b) 
 
AUDIT_IMPT Level of importance placed on certification of CSP (survey 
question 6) 
 
CSP_AUDITED If current Cloud Service Provider (CSP) is audited, 1; otherwise 0 
(survey question 3) 
 
INTENT If still willing to outsource, 1; otherwise 0 (survey question 5) 
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KNOW Knowledge of differences in assurance levels provided (survey 
question 7) 
 
PRIOR_BRCH If prior breach experienced, 1; otherwise 0 (survey questions 4a 
and 4b) 
 
USE_CLOUD  If currently use cloud, 1; otherwise 0 (survey question 1) 
 
The conceptual model presented in Figure 2 below will help explain the intent of this portion of 
the study and identify the important relationships that are under examination. 
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Figure 2 –Conceptual Model for Research Question 3 
 
This conceptual model can be represented by and will be examined using the following 
regression equation: 
INTENT = β0 + β1(AUDIT_IMPT) + β2(AUD_PR_BRCH) + β3(PRIOR_BRCH) + 
β4(AUD_PR_BRCH * AUDIT_IMPT) + ε 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Knowledge of 
Audit Types 
(KNOW) – 
Survey Question 7 
Audited Prior Breach 
Experience 
(AUD_PR_BRCH = 1) 
– Survey Q4b = 1 
Audit Importance 
(AUDIT_IMPT) – 
Survey Question 6 
Unaudited Prior Breach 
Experience 
(AUD_PR_BRCH = 0) 
– Survey Q4a = 1 
Intent to use cloud-based 
services (INTENT) – 
Survey Question 5 
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Hypotheses 
 
 
Addressing research question 1 requires a broad analysis of the data breaches both in the 
aggregate and separately, in order to identify trends in the data that could be exploited to the 
benefit of auditors.  Procedures will be conducted to detect anomalies specific to: overall breach 
frequency as a function of time, breach type as a percent of total breaches, organization type as a 
percent of total breaches, and breach type by organization type.  Trends are easy to spot visually 
by graphing the frequency analysis, so this is the first approach taken.  Hypotheses 1 is based on 
the results of the previously cited recent surveys and popular media, which indicate that the 
frequency of data breaches is continually trending in an upward direction.  This leads to: 
H1: There is a significant positive growth trend in overall breach frequency as 
reported by month. 
Hypothesis 2 is also grounded in the popular media and recent surveys, both of which imply that 
certain breach types are more prevalent and/or more frequently reported as a concern among 
CIOs, giving: 
H2: There is a significant difference in reported breach frequency by breach type. 
 
Hypothesis 3 is derived logically from the fact that different organization types possess differing 
levels of what would be considered readily exploitable information.  For example, manufacturing 
entities would be unlikely to have nearly the number of electronic assets available for 
exploitation – i.e. personal and/or financial information, as would an entity in the financial 
services sector.  Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that breach types that focus on this type of 
exploitation would also focus on those organization types in possession of such assets and/or 
electronic records.  This defines Hypothesis 3 as: 
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H3:  There is a significant difference in reported breach frequency by organization 
type. 
In addition to the aforementioned frequency-graphing technique, Chi-square tests and binary 
logistic regressions will also be performed for Hypotheses 1 through 3 to statistically confirm or 
deny the existence of any noted anomalies. Those findings that are statistically significant will be 
subjected to detailed analysis in Chapter IV; the insignificant findings will only be summarized 
there, with the bulk of their reporting relegated to the appendices. 
The analysis of breach frequency by organization type warrants a more thorough 
dissection due to the potential importance it may represent, as it could provide a specific tool to 
be used by auditors.  Therefore, research question two will endeavor to determine if there is a 
significantly higher incidence of breach associated with any specific pairing of breach type and 
organization type.  This information could substantially improve the efficiency of audits by 
allowing auditors to focus their resources on detecting and preventing specific breach types, 
depending on the organization type of their client.  As in the first three hypotheses, a visual 
analysis of a frequency graph will be performed.  This will be followed by examination of a 
cluster analysis on the breach type variable versus the organization type variable.  This is done to 
group similar observations, which will potentially lessen the volume of work imposed in the 
audit planning process.  Based on this goal and fashioned in accord with Hypotheses 2 and 3, 
Hypothesis 4 becomes: 
H4: There is a significant difference in frequency of breach occurrence based on the 
combination of different pairings of breach types with organization types. 
Research question three seeks to answer multiple questions, namely: a) if prior breach 
experience has any effect on the current outsourcing decision, b) if certification level impacts the 
  
66 
 
current outsourcing decision, and c) if personal knowledge of assurance levels impacts the 
current outsourcing decision.  Given that surveys of CIOs consistently find that security is one of 
the topmost concerns regarding outsourcing, the logical assumption would be that CIOs have 
prior history with security breaches and will therefore be more risk-averse.  A natural secondary 
effect to increased risk-aversion is typically an increase in the requirement for assurance from 
third-parties.  These issues lead to Hypothesis 5, which states: 
H5a: Those with prior breach experience as measured by PRIOR_BRCH will exhibit a 
less positive attitude toward future outsourcing, as measured by their future 
outsourcing intent (INTENT). 
H5b: Given that prior breach experience exists (PRIOR_BRCH=1), there will be a 
greater likelihood of future outsourcing, as measured by future outsourcing intent 
(INTENT) for those whose prior breach (AUD_PR_BRCH) was of an unaudited 
nature. 
Hypothesis 6 is designed to determine if decision-makers who choose to outsource business 
functions to the cloud actually place any importance on the assurance offered by 
SAS70/SSAE16/SOC audit reports on third-party service providers.  Stated in the null, it reads: 
H6: There is no difference in future outsourcing intent (INTENT) based on level of 
importance placed on certification (AUDIT_IMPT). 
Finally, Hypothesis 7 investigates if decision-makers are aware of the differences between the 
assurance levels provided by SAS70/SSAE16/SOC type reports versus SOC Type 2 and Type 3 
audits, the latter being the only type that actually provide assurance specific to non-financial 
reporting goals.  Given the continual media barrage regarding the complexity and importance of 
data security issues, it is expected that CIOs would be current on the issue and be aware of the 
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differences in audits so that their outsourcing decisions are based on the proper information.  
This is examined through Hypothesis 7, which reads: 
H7: There will be a significantly higher proportion of survey respondents who indicate 
that they are familiar with the differences in certification levels (KNOW = 1) than 
those who indicate that they are not familiar with the differences (KNOW = 0). 
 
Tests 
The following procedures are designed to identify and quantify these important 
relationships.  It is acknowledged that other important categories of the source of data breaches 
also exist, for example: provider system crashes and data lost in cyberspace, but they are not 
addressed in this research due to the unavailability of a comprehensive and reliable data source 
for breaches attributable to these causal factors. 
Testing of Hypothesis 1 will be accomplished by graphing the frequency analysis of the 
breaches over time variable (MON_YR).  This will provide a visual analysis to aid in the 
identification of any overall trend in breaches, should one exist.  Next, a Chi-squared statistic 
will be computed to determine if there is a statistically significant difference between the actual 
breach frequency observed and the expected breach frequency based on random ordering of the 
data.  Should any relationship be detected, the visual analysis and Chi-squared testing will be 
repeated for each breach type individually, in an effort to specifically identify which breach 
types are most responsible for the trend. 
Hypothesis 2 will also utilize a graphical representation of a frequency analysis.  The 
evaluation in this case will be of the frequency of each breach type (BRCH_TYP) observed as a 
percent of total breaches.  This is done in an effort to determine visually if there appear to be any 
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anomalies of frequency by breach type.  Again, a Chi-square statistic will be employed to 
determine the statistical significance of any relationship(s) observed.  This procedure will 
identify whether any particular breach type(s) constitute a significant portion of the total reported 
breaches. 
Hypothesis 3 will be analyzed in similar fashion to Hypothesis 2, but the focus will be on 
whether particular organization types report breaches overall at a significantly higher rate than 
other organization types.  Statistical analysis performed will mirror those used in the testing of 
hypothesis 2.  This procedure will identify whether any particular organization types constitute a 
significant portion of the total reported breaches.  
While the specific magnitude and direction of the relationship between data breach 
type(s) and organization type(s) has not previously been quantified, a prudent person would 
acknowledge the likelihood of the existence of a relationship between these two variables.  
Quantification of this relationship is important in that it may help identify the most prevalent 
breach types and the organization types most vulnerable to those breaches.  Specific 
identification of these factors could lead to more efficient audit procedures by allowing auditors 
to more clearly focus their efforts and audit resources, and may even help mitigate future 
breaches.  For that reason, the analysis of the frequency of each pairing of breach type by 
organization type warrants deeper examination, due to its potential importance.  Testing for 
research question 2 will therefore be designed to determine if there is a significantly higher 
incidence of breach associated with any specific pairing of data breach type and organization 
type.  To achieve this goal, Hypothesis 4 will be approached through multiple analyses.  First, 
association between the two variables will be evaluated to confirm or deny the existence of a 
relationship between BRCH_TYP and ORG_TYP.  A Phi coefficient variant of the non-
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parametric Chi-square correlation statistic will be evaluated, which is deemed to be the more 
appropriate correlation-type statistic to use when the variables are both nominal.
4
  Next, a 
frequency graph will be examined for each organization type by all breach types, to help identify 
possible significant combinations.  Then, a cluster analysis will be performed on BRCH_TYP 
versus ORG_TYP, to further consolidate any relationships into more manageable groups. 
Research question 3 constitutes the second portion of the research, which seeks to address 
issues of a slightly different nature and in a different manner, using data from a different source.  
Consequently, testing for Hypotheses 5 through 7 will be based on the data obtained from the 
survey that was conducted.  These hypotheses are designed to indicate the level of importance IT 
decision-makers place on certain outsourcing criteria.  More specifically, Hypothesis 5a will 
examine if prior breaches of any kind impact future outsourcing decisions.  To accomplish this 
analysis, several data subsets must be created.  First a subset must be created containing only 
those responses that replied “yes” to either of survey questions 4a and/or 4b (PRIOR_BRCH=1).  
This will limit cases in this group to only those that indicate they have experienced a breach of 
some sort in the past.  Next, this subset must be further divided into two subsets: those that 
answered “yes” to survey question 5 (INTENT=1) and those that answered “no” (INTENT=0).  
The analysis for Hypothesis 5a will then be accomplished by running a Binary Logistic 
Regression (LOGIT) on these last two groups, which is appropriate for comparisons of sets of 
dichotomous variables.  In this manner it can be determined if a statistically significant 
difference exists between the two groups.  Hypothesis 5a predicts that there will be a difference. 
Hypothesis 5b is designed to infer if there is a difference in future outsourcing intent 
based on audited CSPs versus non-audited, for those who have suffered a prior breach.  The goal 
                                               
4 A Phi-coefficient is a product-moment coefficient of correlation and is a variation of Pearson’s definition of r 
when the two states of each variable are zero and one.  It was specifically designed for comparisons of dichotomous 
distributions – ie.  each value is either yes/no, alive/dead, black/white, etc. 
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is to see if those that were previously “burned” by a breach, associate that outcome with the level 
of assurance they placed in the work of auditors.  As in testing for Hypothesis 5a, a subset must 
be created that contains only “yes” responses to either of survey questions 4a and/or 4b 
(PRIOR_BRCH=1) in order to isolate only those having experienced some sort of prior breach.  
Testing will then be accomplished by conducting a non-parametric Chi-Squared test on the 
PRIOR_BRCH and AUD_PR_BRCH variables for this group.  The specific test performed in 
this case is a McNemar’s variation of the Chi-Squared test.  It is most appropriate, because it is 
specifically designed to be applied to 2x2 contingency tables with a dichotomous trait, which is 
the case under examination here.  It is also indicated for use when dichotomous variables are in 
use that also exhibit significant correlation. 
Hypothesis 6 is designed to examine the level of confidence that IT decision-makers have 
in the assurance given by audit reports issued on third-party service providers, and the role it 
plays on their future outsourcing decisions.  To accomplish this will require a comparison of the 
INTENT variable with the AUDIT_IMPT variable.  A binary logistic regression test will be 
conducted, regressing AUDIT_IMPT on INTENT. This test is appropriate because the DV in the 
equation (INTENT) is dichotomous and the IV (AUDIT_IMP) is ordinal.   
Finally, Hypothesis 7 seeks to determine if an IT director’s level of understanding of the 
differences in assurance implied by the various auditor reports has an effect on his or her future 
outsourcing intent.  This will be accomplished by comparing the future intent variable (INTENT) 
with the familiarity variable (KNOW).  A simple binary logistic regression (LOGIT) will be used 
for this purpose. 
In the analyses of Hypotheses 5 through 7 above, logistic regressions are conducted.  
Consideration was given to the use of loglinear analysis, since some authors would consider this 
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to be the method deemed most appropriate for use here because it works well for categorical 
response variables with more than two categories, which the classical form of logistic regression 
does not (Stevens, 2002).  However, for purposes of this research, in those instances where 
LOGIT was employed, any categorical data under review was broken into dichotomous variables 
prior to performing any regressions, and therefore loglinear analysis was deemed unnecessary.  
The expected results of this study were that there exist anomalies in the frequency of 
breaches both by breach type and by organization type.  It was also expected that there are 
significant relationships between types of data breaches and the types of organizations that 
experience these breaches.  It was further proposed that these relationships, once identified, can 
be exploited to aid in the conduct of examinations of third-party service providers in order to 
mitigate some of the breaches and perhaps build consumer confidence in the data security 
assurance provided by the audit process.  It was also expected that certain criteria are more 
important to the decision to outsource critical business data and processes into the cloud than 
others.  Identification of these important criteria should provide opportunities to focus audit 
resources on those areas considered most important to consumers.  This survey investigation may 
also reveal an “education” problem in the accounting industry, whereby IT decision-makers are 
still unsure of the level of assurance being implied by the audit product in which they are placing 
their faith.  Results of the procedures as outlined in this section are presented in the next section 
and will provide answers to these issues. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RESULTS 
 
This research was conducted with several goals in mind: to determine if any significant 
anomalies exist in reported data breach frequencies that could aid auditors, to empirically 
establish that the threat level posed by data breaches varies by type of breach and type of 
organization, to quantify the relationships between breach type and organization type, and to 
identify factors that affect the decisions of CIOs regarding their consideration of whether to 
employ cloud/datacenter-hosted solutions.  As previously discussed, the data on breaches comes 
from the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse and contains information segregated into eight separate 
breach classifications.    Statistical analysis of each of these eight categories reveals associations 
that could prove useful to auditors, so this section will present results of those analyses using all 
2,847 observations contained in the full database. 
 
Research Question One 
 
 
Research question one asks whether there are any significant anomalies in reported breach 
data that could be used to benefit auditors.  
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The data was examined in a manner to detect relationships that might prove useful to auditors, 
including: overall breach frequency as a function of time, percent of total breaches assigned to 
each individual breach type, percent of total breaches borne by each organization type, and 
breach type by organization type.  Results of these analyses indicate that factors do exist that 
could prove beneficial to auditors in the risk assessment phase of their engagement planning.  
Details of each analysis are provided below. 
Addressing Hypothesis 1 begins with a visual inspection of the data.  A timeline, displayed 
in Figure 3, displays one data point for each month/year, which yields 84 observations. 
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Figure 3 – Total Breaches Trend Analysis 
 
The initial inspection of the data shows that there is a trend over time, providing support to the 
media hype that such is the case.  Even though there are noticeable peaks and valleys evident 
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between months, the trend is clearly in an upward direction overall, as indicated by the 
superimposed linear trend line.  This is further supported by the realization that there were only 
three breaches reported in January of 2005 and 50 reported in December 2011.  So even on a 
simple linear basis, this represents a more than ten-fold growth in the number of reported 
breaches over just the past seven years.  Confirmation that this pattern is statistically significant 
is provided by computing a Chi-squared test statistic.  Significance for all the following tests is 
set at the level of α = 0.05, unless otherwise specified.  Presented in Table 2, this Chi-squared 
indicates a significant positive relationship (Phi = .560, p = .000 at the .05 level).  The Phi 
coefficient is specifically targeted toward evaluations of nominal variables, as is the case here, 
and is therefore deemed the most appropriate test statistic (see footnote 4). 
 
 
Table 2 – Significance Test of Breach Frequency Trend 
 
Having established the existence of a significant growth trend, the logical next step is to 
attempt to identify if any particular breach types are more responsible for this trend.  This 
Value df
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 893.799 581 .000
Likelihood Ratio 912.531 581 .000
N of Valid Cases 2,847
Value
Approx. 
Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi .560 .000
Cramer's V .212 .000
2,847
Chi-Square Tests
N of Valid Cases
Symmetric Measures
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information could prove valuable, allowing auditors to address the “worst case” scenario(s) first.  
To that end, each breach type was then plotted individually over the 84-month period.   This 
further analysis reveals that six of the eight breach types contribute at a significant level to the 
growth in the breach trend.  The only two categories that are not statistically significant 
contributors to the overall growth trend are STATIONARY and UNKNOWN.  Evidence of the 
significant breach types is presented in the following tables and graphs; the graphs and tables for 
the non-significant breach types are relegated to the appendices. 
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Figure 4 - "Unintended Disclosure" Trend 
 
The positive association of the Unintended Disclosure (DISC) trend implied in figure 4 is 
confirmed to be significant in Table 3 by the Phi coefficient of .214 with a significant p-value of 
.001.  This implies that reported breaches of this type have been rising at a significant rate since 
2005.  This could indicate that more persons are careless with the data that they control or simply 
that the reporting of this type of breach has become more prevalent. 
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Table 3 – Significance Test of “Unintended Disclosure” Trend 
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Figure 5 - "Hacking or Malware" Trend 
 
The Hacking or Malware (HACK) breach type also demonstrates a positive association as 
evidenced in Figure 5, and it is confirmed to be significant in Table 4 (Phi coefficient = .243, p = 
Value df
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 130.317 83 .001
Likelihood Ratio 123.678 83 .003
N of Valid Cases 2,847
Value
Approx. 
Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi .214 .001
Cramer's V .214 .001
2,847
Chi-Square Tests
Symmetric Measures
N of Valid Cases
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.000).  Again, this confirms that reporting of breaches based on this classification has risen 
significantly since 2005.  This could be indicative of an increase in available targets, a decrease 
in security diligence, or simply a heightened trend in breach reporting. 
 
 
 
Table 4 - Significance Test of "Hacking or Malware" Trend 
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Figure 6 - "Payment Card Fraud" Trend 
Value df
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 167.687 83 .000
Likelihood Ratio 159.928 83 .000
N of Valid Cases 2,847
Value
Approx. 
Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi .243 .000
Cramer's V .243 .000
2,847
Symmetric Measures
N of Valid Cases
Chi-Square Tests
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Without the superimposed linear trend line, Figure 6 would appear to suggest that no trend is 
present in the Payment Card Fraud (CARD) breach type.  However, Table 5 indicates the 
existence of a significant positive association (Phi coefficient = .206, p = .004).  Caution should 
be exercised in drawing any conclusion here due to the small sample size (41 observations) and 
the high number of cells containing 0 observations. 
 
 
Table 5- Significance Test of "Payment Card Fraud" Trend 
Value df
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 121.075 83 .004
Likelihood Ratio 103.195 83 .066
N of Valid Cases 2,847
Value
Approx. 
Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi .206 .004
Cramer's V .206 .004
2,847
Symmetric Measures
N of Valid Cases
Chi-Square Tests
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Figure 7 - "Insider" Trend 
 
Similar to all those that precede it, breach type Insider (INSD) is also significantly and positively 
associated with the overall breach trend for the period under investigation.  The statistics in 
Table 6 (Phi coefficient = .225, p = .000) confirm this assertion. 
 
 
Table 6 - Significance Test of "Insider” Trend 
 
Value df
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 143.700 83 .000
Likelihood Ratio 161.423 83 .000
N of Valid Cases 2,847
Value
Approx. 
Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi .225 .000
Cramer's V .225 .000
2,847N of Valid Cases
Symmetric Measures
Chi-Square Tests
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Figure 8 - "Physical Loss” Trend 
 
The significance of the contribution of the Physical Loss (PHYS) breach type is fairly obvious 
and its positive significant contribution is borne out by the data in Table 7 (Phi coefficient = 
.212, p = .001). 
 
 
Table 7 - Significance Test of "Physical Loss" Trend 
 
Value df
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 127.472 83 .001
Likelihood Ratio 148.082 83 .000
N of Valid Cases 2,847
Value
Approx. 
Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi .212 .001
Cramer's V .212 .001
2,847
Symmetric Measures
N of Valid Cases
Chi-Square Tests
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Figure 9 - "Portable Device" Trend 
 
Figure 9 displays a graph that implies a positive growth in the Portable Device (PORT) breach 
trend, but the trend is so moderate that it is not easily translated into a significance level.  
However, the accompanying Table 8, does confirm a significant positive trend (Phi coefficient = 
.236, p = .000). 
 
 
Table 8 - Significance Test of "Portable Device" Trend 
Value df
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 158.758 83 .000
Likelihood Ratio 157.966 83 .000
N of Valid Cases 2,847
Value
Approx. 
Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi .236 .000
Cramer's V .236 .000
2,847
Symmetric Measures
N of Valid Cases
Chi-Square Tests
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Unfortunately, there is no clear “worst case” breach type trend, as was hoped.  Consequently, 
this result provides minimal assistance to auditors in narrowing their focus.  As previously 
disclosed, the last two breach type categories (STATIONARY and UNKNOWN) do not have a 
statistically significant relationship to the trend in the breach frequency as a whole, and are 
consequently not presented here.  They are included in Appendix 6 for information purposes. 
Of a more promising nature, the result from testing of Hypothesis 2 clearly indicates that 
certain breach types comprise a significant portion of the total reported breaches.  Figure 10 
reveals that almost 65% of all breaches fall into just 3 of the 8 categories. 
 
 
Figure 10 – Percent of each Breach Type of Total Breach Frequency 
 
Further evaluation of this anomaly is accomplished through computation of a Chi-squared 
statistic to determine if the actual data dispersion differs in a statistically significant manner than 
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what would be expected.  These results are presented in Table 9 below and indicate that the 
difference is significant.  Note a. confirms that all cells have at least 5 observations, which 
strengthens the result. 
 
Table 9 – Significance Test of Total Breach Frequency by Breach Type 
 
The importance of this information lies in the recognition that the three breach types representing 
the largest percentage of total breaches comprise 64.8% of all reported breaches.  This 
knowledge alone is valuable to auditors seeking to maximize their limited resources when trying 
to combat the data breach problem.  Efforts should be allocated first to breaches of the Portable 
Device group, then the Hacking or Malware group and then the Unintended Disclosure type.  
Addressing only these three types should provide assurance against roughly two-thirds of all 
breaches.  On the other hand, breach types Stationary Device, Unknown and Payment Card 
Fraud only comprise 11.1% of total reported breaches.  Auditors should allocate resources to 
these areas sparingly, as the return on investment would appear to be small. 
Hypothesis 3 testing indicates that certain organization types experience breaches at 
significantly higher rates than the mean (14.2%), as presented in Figure 11.  As seen here, over 
60% of all data breaches are borne by only 3 of the 7 organization types.  The data indicate that 
auditors of organization types Educational Institutions, Medical/Healthcare Providers, and 
BRCH_TYP
Chi-Square 1283.048
a
df 7
Asymp. Sig. .000
Test Statistics
a. 0 cells  (.0%) have expected frequencies  less  than 5. 
The minimum expected cell frequency is  355.9.
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Government/Military should place a higher level of importance on the possibility of data 
breaches than organizations in the other four organization types. 
 
 
Figure 11 – Percent of Total Breach Frequency by Organization Type 
 
As was done in Hypothesis 2, the findings in Figure 11 are evaluated further through 
computation of a Chi-squared statistic.  Table 10 confirms that there is a statistically significant 
difference in the dispersion of breaches among organization types from the expected distribution 
based on random chance.  It should be noted that Table 9 was calculated using the total number 
of breaches of each type and Table 10 was calculated using the total number of organizations 
within each type group.  Figures 10 and 11 were displayed with the percentages instead of the 
raw numbers for clarity of presentation purposes only. 
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Table 10 – Significance Test of Total Breach Frequency by Organization Type 
Hypotheses 1 through 3 confirm that significant relationships do exist for breaches by breach 
type, organization type, and over time.  A natural extension of this line of investigation is to 
wonder if a relationship between breach type and organization type may exist and, if significant, 
could it be exploited to the benefit of those parties involved in the assurance of, and/or 
consumption of, third-party service provider services.  Due to the potential importance of this 
query, research question two will be devoted entirely to the investigation of breach type by 
organization type.  Tables containing the supporting data for Figures 10 and 11 are provided in 
Appendix 7. 
 
Research Question Two 
 
 
Research question two is designed to specifically identify the breach type/organization 
type pairings that occur at a higher frequency level than expected.  This is assuming that a 
significant and measurable relationship does exist between the two variables.  Testing for 
Hypothesis 4 begins by employing measures to empirically establish or refute the existence of 
such a relationship.  Note that Tables 37 through 43, containing supporting data for Figures 12 
through 18 that address Hypothesis 4, are provided in Appendix 8 for those interested in the raw 
data. 
ORG_TYP
Chi-Square 536.714
a
df 6
Asymp. Sig. .000
Test Statistics
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. 
The minimum expected cell frequency is 406.7.
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While there is no universally-agreed rule as to the ranking of the strength of associations, 
many authors use the following general rule: 
 -1.0 to -0.7 strong negative association 
 -0.7 to -0.3 weak negative association 
 -0.3 to +0.3 little or no association 
 +0.3 to +0.7 weak positive association 
 +0.7 to +1.0 strong positive association 
Table 11 indicates that a statistically significant relationship exists between the breach 
type and the organization type variables in the data contained in the Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse database.  The non-parametric phi coefficient variant of the Chi-square correlation 
statistic is again evaluated from the table, as it is most appropriate when both variables are 
categorical (Nominal by Nominal).  When evaluated based on this classification scheme, the 
association between BRCH_TYP and ORG_TYP is established as a weak positive association 
(Phi = .464) and it is statistically significant (Sig. = .000 at the .05 level). 
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Table 11 - Association between Breach Type and Org Type 
Having established that a statistically significant relationship does indeed exist between breach 
type and organization type, the next step is to further analyze individual components of that 
relationship in an attempt to identify specifics that may be exploited.  To that end, the figures and 
tables on the following pages will analyze each organization type against all breach types so that 
specific guidance can be developed based on the threats most likely to be experienced by each 
organization type.  
Figure 12 provides important information for auditors engaged by companies that fall 
into the Business-Other (BSO) organization type category, as it indicates that over 55% of all 
breaches suffered by these type entities are the result of only two breach types (Hacking or 
Malware, and Portable Device).  Auditors of BSO organizations may be able to gain efficiencies 
by focusing their efforts in these two breach areas. 
 
Value
Asymp. Std. 
Error
a
Approx. T
b
Approx. 
Sig.
Phi .464 .000
Cramer's V .189 .000
Interval by 
Interval
Pearson's R .102 .018 5.492 .000
c
Ordinal by 
Ordinal
Spearman 
Correlation
.109 .018 5.824 .000
c
2,847
c. Based on normal approximation.
Chi-Square
Nominal by 
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
a. Not assuming the null hypothes is .
b. Using the asymptotic s tandard error assuming the null hypothes is .
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Figure 12 - Breaches for “Business-Other” Sector Entities (n = 354) 
 
The significance of these findings are presented in Table 12, which indicates a significant 
positive association (phi coefficient = .084, p = .006). 
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Table 12 - Significance Test for “Business-Other” Sector 
Figure 13 should prove useful to auditors engaged by companies that fall into the organization 
type Business, Financial and Insurance (BSF) category, since it indicates that over 60% of all 
breaches suffered by these type entities are the result of only three breach types (Hacking or 
Malware, Insider, and Portable Device).  The Portable Device breach type alone accounts for 
over 30% of all breaches experienced by these type entities. 
 
Value df
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 19.927 7 .006
Likelihood Ratio 19.840 7 .006
Linear-by-Linear Association .131 1 .717
N of Valid Cases 2,847
Value Approx. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .084 .006
Cramer's V .084 .006
N of Valid Cases 2,847
Symmetric Measures
Chi-Square Tests
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Figure 13 - Breaches for Business, Financial and Insurance Sector Entities (n = 412) 
Confirmation of the significance of this relationship is provided in Table 13.  The relationship is 
clearly significant (phi coefficient = .136, p = .000). 
 
 
Table 13 - Significance Test for Business, Financial and Insurance Sector Entities 
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DISC HACK CARD INSD PHYS PORT STAT UNKN
Org Type - BSF
Percent
Value df
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 52.827 7 .000
Likelihood Ratio 45.582 7 .000
Linear-by-Linear Association 7.389 1 .007
N of Valid Cases 2,847
Value
Approx. 
Sig.
Phi .136 .000
Cramer's V .136 .000
2,847
Chi-Square Tests
Nominal by Nominal
N of Valid Cases
Symmetric Measures
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Figure 14 provides similar data on organization type Business-Retail (BSR).  Apparently, retail 
organizations are heavily targeted by hackers, as 36.6% of all retail breaches are associated with 
this source.  Armed with this knowledge, auditors of these type entities would likely want to 
increase their examination of the internal controls designed to secure the entity’s data assets from 
unauthorized access by external parties.  They should work with systems designers to implement 
controls to detect and prevent such access from occurring before the external party has a chance 
to do any damage, or to at least minimize the damage that could be done. 
 
 
Figure 14 - Breaches for Retail Sector Entities (n = 298) 
This relationship is indeed statistically significant as verified by the Chi-square statistics reported 
in Table 14 (phi coefficient = .249, p = .000). 
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Table 14 - Significance Test for Retail Business Sector 
Figure 15 provides results of the same analysis for educational institutions.  As nearly 80% of all 
breaches occur in the top three breach categories (DISK, HACK & PORT), auditors could 
certainly benefit from this knowledge when working with clients in the EDU category.  Working 
in conjunction with systems designers, auditors should be able to make great progress in 
preventing, or at least minimizing the impact of data breaches at Educational Institutions.  Fully 
four-sevenths of the breach types could be ignored completely and the data indicates that 
Educational Institutions would benefit by a 79.4% reduction in breach exposure.  Assuming that 
audit efforts are already being expended, it is likely that additional efforts would be unnecessary 
– all that is needed is to focus the current effort to gain the maximum benefit. 
 
Value df
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 176.035 7 .000
Likelihood Ratio 135.978 7 .000
Linear-by-Linear Association 21.565 1 .000
N of Valid Cases 2,847
Value
Approx. 
Sig.
Phi .249 .000
Cramer's V .249 .000
N of Valid Cases 2,847
Chi-Square Tests
Symmetric Measures
Nominal by Nominal
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Figure 15 - Breaches for Educational Sector Entities (n = 578) 
As in previous examinations, the Chi-square statistic is calculated and used here to confirm the 
significance of the relationship suggested in Figure 15.  Significance is confirmed in Table 15 
(phi coefficient = .261, p = .000). 
 
Table 15 - Significance Test for Education Sector 
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Percent
Value df
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 194.446 7 .000
Likelihood Ratio 212.005 7 .000
Linear-by-Linear Association 86.261 1 .000
N of Valid Cases 2,847
Value
Approx. 
Sig.
Phi .261 .000
Cramer's V .261 .000
N of Valid Cases 2,847
Chi-Square Tests
Symmetric Measures
Nominal by Nominal
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Governmental organizations appear to get hit hard on numerous fronts, as noted in Figure 16.  
However, since almost 55% of all breaches are classified into only two categories (DISC & 
PORT), this still represents an opportunity for auditors to streamline their approach to such an 
audit.  The data indicates that almost three-fourths of breaches within a Government/Military 
type organization could be addressed by focusing all breach-related audit resources on only the 
Portable Device, Unintended Disclosure, and Physical Loss breach types.  Some individuals may 
find certain breach type/organization type pairings curious.  For example, why would 
Government/Military organizations be left alone by those responsible for the Hackers or 
Malware breach type, as is suggested by the data?  Perhaps rather than signifying that they are 
not subjected to this type of breach, the data could be indicating that the Government/Military 
organizations are expending more of their resources in prevention of these breaches, and 
therefore their reported frequency is significantly lower.  If this is the case, the data also indicate 
that these organization types are particularly sensitive to physical security, as evidenced by the 
Stationary Device breach category accounting for a mere 4% of the total breaches reported.  This 
explanation is plausible, as it is widely known that governmental and military agencies are 
particularly attuned to physical security of property and physical access to locations and assets.  
The Educational Institutions organization type offers similarly interesting observations.  Most 
prudent observers would probably agree that the security of the data that educational institutions 
possess is not nearly as critical as that of Government/Military organizations.  Consequently, 
Educational Institutions organizations experience a significantly higher incidence of Hacking or 
Malware type breach.  This could indicate that few resources are expended in these type 
organizations to combat breaches of this nature, as the cost/benefit to combat them is not 
justifiable. 
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Figure 16 - Breaches for Governmental Sector Entities (n = 524) 
 
The relationship is significant, as evidenced in Table 16 (phi coefficient = .171, p = .000). 
 
 
Table 16 - Significance Test for Governmental Sector 
27.1
9.9
11.3
17.0
27.7
4.0
3.1
.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
DISC HACK INSD PHYS PORT STAT UNKN
Org Type - GOV
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Value df
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 82.795 7 .000
Likelihood Ratio 91.616 7 .000
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.729 1 .099
N of Valid Cases 2,847
Value
Approx. 
Sig.
Phi .171 .000
Cramer's V .171 .000
N of Valid Cases 2,847
Chi-Square Tests
Symmetric Measures
Nominal by Nominal
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In medical organizations, almost 40% of all breaches experienced are traceable to just one breach 
type (PORT).  This result is clearly significant, as evidenced by the statistics reported in Table 
17.  How best to address this issue is beyond the scope of the current research, but it clearly 
represents an opportunity for auditors to focus their examination in this area when auditing 
hospitals and other organizations classified in the MED category.  Figure 17 implies the 
magnitude of this observation.  Closer examination of this data also reveals that the percentage of 
reported breaches attributable to Hacking or Malware is significantly low, at only 4.5%.  A very 
plausible explanation for this might be the high level of importance placed on prevention of data 
breaches as legislated by the HIPAA act of 1996.  Under the provisions of this act, imposition of 
substantial fines and penalties were mandated for any business that allowed personal and/or 
medical data of patients to be accessed by unauthorized parties.  It would appear that these type 
organizations have already been motivated to focus their resources toward prevention of 
breaches of this type.  
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Figure 17 - Breaches for Medical Sector Entities (n = 616) 
 
 
Table 17 - Significance Test for Medical Sector 
 
Following the pattern of the medical organizations, non-profit organizations also seem to suffer 
an unusually high incidence of breaches in the PORT category.  As Figure 18 displays, this 
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DISC HACK INSD PHYS PORT STAT UNKN
Org Type - MED
Percent
Value df
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 202.139 7 .000
Likelihood Ratio 235.996 7 .000
Linear-by-Linear Association 122.913 1 .000
N of Valid Cases 2,847
Value
Approx. 
Sig.
Phi .266 .000
Cramer's V .266 .000
N of Valid Cases 2,847
Chi-Square Tests
Symmetric Measures
Nominal by Nominal
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single category accounts for over 43% of all breaches suffered by organizations classified as 
NGO.  Most prudent individuals would deem this knowledge to be a clear opportunity to 
improve this statistic. 
 
 
Figure 18 - Breaches for Non-profit Sector Entities (n = 65) 
 
However, the result in the case of non-profit organizations differs from all the previous “breach 
type by organization type” analyses presented thus far, in that the result is not statistically 
significant.  This is somewhat surprising because it certainly appears in Figure 18 that it would 
be significant.   However, it is not, as is determined by the Chi-square test results presented in 
Table 18 (phi coefficient = .065, p = .099). 
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Table 18 - Significance Test for Non-profit Sector 
 
In the final analysis, all organization types exhibit strong associations with specific breach types, 
with the exception of the non-profit organization type.  Armed with this knowledge, auditors 
may find that they can wring further efficiencies out of their audit engagements.  However, 
developing audit guidelines is a lengthy and expensive process.  Because of this, it may be more 
practical to group some of these associations together based on similarities, which would further 
simplify the process of incorporating the current research into the auditor’s toolbox.  To 
accomplish this, the next step is to perform a cluster analysis.   
A cluster analysis is designed to group items into “clusters” that share common 
characteristics.  A cluster is a group of relatively homogeneous observations – i.e., the objects in 
each cluster are similar in nature.  It also means that items in a cluster are dissimilar to items in 
other clusters.  Performing this analysis should allow auditors to narrow their focus, yet not get 
so narrow as to exceed the cost/benefit of the exercise.  So instead of developing separate 
planning for each of the seven organization types and each of the eight breach types, they can 
Value df
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 12.043 7 .099
Likelihood Ratio 13.481 7 .061
Linear-by-Linear Association 7.022 1 .008
N of Valid Cases 2,847
Value
Approx. 
Sig.
Phi .065 .099
Cramer's V .065 .099
N of Valid Cases 2,847
Chi-Square Tests
Symmetric Measures
Nominal by Nominal
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just develop plans that address a relatively few clusters.  The similarity of cases in the cluster 
should allow for similar processes to address the breach challenges faced by organizations 
represented by that cluster.  The results of the cluster analysis are presented in tables 19 through 
21, below. 
 
Table 19 - Overall Cluster Distribution 
 
As indicated in Table 19, a cluster analysis of the breach types vs. organization types results in 
the data being allocated into only four clusters.  In the following discussion, since there are only 
4 clusters, any contribution to a cluster of 25% or more is deemed to be an important contributor 
to that cluster and are bolded in Tables 20 and 21 to so indicate.  The clusters were derived based 
on the following data groupings: 
 
 
Table 20 - Clusters based on Breach Type 
 
N
% of 
Total
1 839 29.5%
2 765 26.9%
3 788 27.7%
4 455 16.0%
2,847 100.0%
Cluster
Total
Cluster Distribution
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
1 437 86.5% 402 75.3% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0%
2 63 12.5% 0 .0% 2 4.9% 207 65.5% 288 78.0% 0 .0% 152 79.6% 53 61.6%
3 5 1.0% 132 24.7% 0 .0% 4 1.3% 8 2.2% 631 78.4% 5 2.6% 3 3.5%
4 0 .0% 0 .0% 39 95.1% 105 33.2% 73 19.8% 174 21.6% 34 17.8% 30 34.9%
Total 505 100% 534 100% 41 100% 316 100% 369 100% 805 100% 191 100% 86 100%
Cluster
HACK CARD
BRCH_TYP
DISC INSD STAT UNKNPHYS PORT
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Table 20 defines which breach types are most closely identified by each cluster.  For example, 
Cluster 1 contains only DISC and HACK type breaches.  Cluster 2 is predominantly comprised 
of INSD, PHYS, STAT, and UNKN breaches.  Cluster 3 is almost entirely PORT and HACK, 
and Cluster 4 is mainly CARD, INSD and UNKN.  A similar breakdown of the information by 
organization type is presented in Table 21 below. 
 
 
Table 21 - Clusters based on Organization Type 
 
As indicated, Table 21 defines which organization types are most closely identified by each 
cluster.  So Cluster 1 is comprised of BSF, BSR, EDU and GOV organization types.  Cluster 2 is 
predominantly BSO, GOV, and MED.  Cluster 3 is largely populated by BSO, GOV and MED 
organizations, and Cluster 4 is almost entirely BSF and BSR.  Crossing the information from 
Tables 20 and 21 allows the development of a description of a representative of each cluster, and 
therefore will enhance audit focus because simply identifying the cluster membership of the 
client organization, auditors can concentrate on the breaches most likely to occur to 
organizations within that cluster.  For example, Cluster 1 is predominantly comprised of 
organization types BSF, BSR, EDU and GOV, and almost entirely breach types DISC and 
HACK.  Therefore, if the client organization is BSF, BSR, EDU or GOV, the auditor’s resources 
in regards to breaches should be concentrated on detecting and/or preventing DISC and HACK 
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
1 49 13.8% 116 28.2% 139 46.6% 341 59.0% 194 37.0% 0 .0% 0 .0%
2 109 30.8% 0 .0% 0 .0% 119 20.6% 185 35.3% 352 57.1% 0 .0%
3 196 55.4% 0 .0% 0 .0% 118 20.4% 145 27.7% 264 42.9% 65 100%
4 0 .0% 296 71.8% 159 53.4% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0%
Total 354 100% 412 100% 298 100% 578 100% 524 100% 616 100% 65 100%
Cluster
ORG_TYP
BSO BSF BSR NGOEDU GOV MED
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type breaches.  A similar descriptive breakout of breach/organization type correlation (group 
membership description) can easily be determined for clusters 2, 3 and 4.  Note that while 
relying on the cluster analysis may reduce workload somewhat for auditors, some granularity is 
lost by combining the cases together in this manner.  This could result in less effective 
procedures being applied in some audits. 
 
Research Question Three 
 
 
Research question three seeks to answer multiple questions, namely: a) if prior breach experience 
has any effect on the current outsourcing decision, b) if certification level impacts the current 
outsourcing decision, and c) if personal knowledge of assurance levels impacts the current 
outsourcing decision.  In this portion of the study, the issues under examination are of a different 
nature.  Consequently, the testing methods employed will differ from those used in the previous 
section. 
 Testing for Hypothesis 5a is designed to establish if prior breach exposure has an impact 
on an IT director’s future outsourcing decisions.  The testing was designed to examine the 
relationship between the PRIOR_BRCH variable (which is based on the “yes” responses to 
either of questions 4a or 4b of the survey) with the future INTENT variable (derived from 
question 5 of the survey).  Unfortunately, as indicated by the absence of any valid “yes” 
responses (i.e. “1s”) in table 22 below, not a single survey was returned that claimed any 
experience with prior breaches.   
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Table 22 - Frequency Data for Survey Questions 4a & 4b 
 
This could be interpreted to mean that breaches are just not as prevalent as originally believed, 
but it is much more likely to indicate selection bias – i.e., those that have previously experienced 
breaches may have opted not to participate in the survey for this or some other reason.  
Unfortunately, lack of any positive responses to questions 4a and 4b makes statistical evaluation 
of Hypothesis 5a impossible.  Due to this complication, no inferences whatsoever should be 
made based on this data.   
 As is the case with Hypothesis 5a, evaluation of Hypothesis 5b is dependent upon having 
a testable population of responses to questions 4a and 4b.  The intent of Hypothesis 5b was to 
isolate the audited versus unaudited component of the INTENT variable and look for an effect of 
the audit experience on the future intent of IT directors.  Due to the limitations imposed by the 
small and possibly biased sample response pool, Hypothesis 5b is also un-testable. 
Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
Valid 0 97 47.8 100.0
Missing System 106 52.2
203 100.0
Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
Valid 0 97 47.8 100.0
Missing System 106 52.2
203 100.0
Survey Question 4a
Total
Survey Question 4b
Total
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Hypothesis 6 is designed to examine the level of confidence that IT decision-makers have 
in the assurance given by audit reports issued on third-party service providers, and the role it 
plays on their future outsourcing decisions.  Testing of this relationship requires a comparison of 
the INTENT variable with the AUDIT_IMPT variable.  As indicated by the frequency analysis 
in Table 23, of the 203 respondents to the survey, only 14 even answered the INTENT question 
(6 positive and 8 negative responses). 
 
 
Table 23 - Future Outsourcing Intent 
 
Table 24 presents the frequency analysis of the AUDIT_IMP variable.  Of the 14 observations 
reported in Table 23 for question 5, only 11 also answered survey question 6.  This leaves a 
sample so small that any test performed would lack sufficient power to be valid.  
 
Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
0 8 3.9 57.1
1 6 3.0 42.9
Total 14 6.9 100.0
Missing System 189 93.1
203 100.0Total
Survey Question 5 (INTENT)
Valid
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Table 24 - Importance of 3rd-Party Service Provider Audits 
 
Taken together, Tables 23 and 24 provide only 11 observations on which to test Hypothesis 6.  
Clearly there is a lack of sufficient data to perform the planned binary logistic regression and 
make any meaningful evaluation of the result. 
Finally, Hypothesis 7 seeks to determine if an IT director’s level of understanding of the 
differences in assurance implied by the various auditor reports has an effect on his or her future 
outsourcing intent.  This was to be accomplished by comparing the future intent variable 
(INTENT) with the familiarity variable (KNOW) via a simple binary logistic regression.  
However, as is evident in Table 23 above, a maximum of 14 observations would be possible in 
this analysis as this is the total responses to survey question 5 (INTENT).  The analysis for 
Hypothesis 7 is further limited because only 12 of the 14 potential responses also contained a 
response to survey question 7 (KNOW).  Consequently, no meaningful analysis can be 
performed on this data either. 
Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
1 25 12.3 31.6
2 3 1.5 3.8
3 5 2.5 6.3
4 6 3.0 7.6
5 7 3.4 8.9
6 2 1.0 2.5
7 7 3.4 8.9
8 6 3.0 7.6
9 18 8.9 22.8
Total 79 38.9 100.0
Missing System 124 61.1
203 100.0
Survey Question 6 (AUDIT_IMP)
Valid
Total
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In the examination of Hypotheses 6 and 7 above, the indicated tests were performed on 
the extremely limited sample(s) available.  However, the results are not reported here due to the 
belief that no reliable inferences can be drawn from such limited data.  The findings from these 
analyses are provided in Appendices 9 and 10 for those parties who may still want to view them.  
Extreme caution is warranted when evaluating these tables and any attempt to make inferences 
based on them is strongly discouraged.  As shown in Table 25, of the 203 valid responses 
received, only question 7 contained a response from more than 50% of the respondents.  Some 
were so low as to be effectively useless, like the 14 total valid responses to question 5. 
 
 
Table 25 - Survey Response Frequency 
 
As in the case for testing of hypotheses 5 through 7, adequate data was not available to run the 
calculation of the overall regression presented in association with Figure 2 of Chapter III. 
The effort expended on this portion of the study was not, however, completely in vain.  
Some patterns emerge from an analysis of the responses from the survey that may prove 
interesting and provide impetus to future studies.  For example, as indicated in Table 26, over 
38% of all respondents indicate that they do in fact consider themselves to be consumers of cloud 
services in one form or another.  This is a fairly high percentage, considering all the concerns 
associated with cloud usage. 
SQ1 SQ3 SQ4a SQ4b SQ5 SQ6 SQ7
Valid 203 77 97 97 14 79 111
Missing 0 126 106 106 189 124 92
Frequency
N
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Table 26 - Cloud Use 
 
Another observation that may be of interest is illuminated in Table 27.  Of the 203 total 
responses, only 77 even knew whether or not their 3rd-party service provider had audit services 
performed, which represents only 38%.  An even smaller number (27) indicated that the audits 
were in place.  This indicates that barely 13% of the entities that are consuming cloud services 
can confirm that their 3rd-party service provider has benefit of audit services of some type.   
 
 
Table 27 - 3rd-party Service Provider Audited? 
 
It appears that consumers of cloud services are either not aware of the assurance services 
provided by the accounting profession regarding 3rd-party service providers, or they simply 
don’t see the value in such services and consequently consume without regard for security 
assurance in any form.   
Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
0 125 61.6 61.6
1 78 38.4 38.4
Total 203 100.0 100.0
Survey Question 1 (USE_CLOUD)
Valid
Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
0 50 24.6 64.9
1 27 13.3 35.1
Total 77 37.9 100.0
Missing System 126 62.1
203 100.0
Survey Question 3 (CSP_AUDITED)
Valid
Total
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An examination of Table 28 reveals that responders seem to be polarized on the 
importance of assurance service reporting on their 3rd-party service providers, with 31.6% 
placing minimal importance on the reporting and 22.8% indicating that it is critical. 
 
Table 28 – Reported Importance of 3rd-party Service Provider Audit Reports 
 
 As reported previously in this study, only those engagements resulting in the issuance of 
an SOC type 2 or type 3 report are specifically designed to address issues associated with data 
security and integrity in the audit of a 3rd-party service provider.  Survey question seven was 
specifically constructed to determine if this information is known to the consumers of cloud 
services.  It appears that the accounting profession is failing in its efforts to enhance the 
perceived value of this service by educating the potential consumer market.  As evidenced in 
Table 29, only 16.2% of respondents who answered this question claimed to know the difference 
in the audit reports issued on 3rd-party service providers.  This means that 83.8% would 
potentially consume cloud services blindly, or they believe themselves to be afforded some sort 
Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
1 25 12.3 31.6
2 3 1.5 3.8
3 5 2.5 6.3
4 6 3.0 7.6
5 7 3.4 8.9
6 2 1.0 2.5
7 7 3.4 8.9
8 6 3.0 7.6
9 18 8.9 22.8
Total 79 38.9 100.0
Missing System 124 61.1
203 100.0
Survey Question 6 (AUDIT_IMP)
Valid
Total
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of protection (by relying on the incorrect reports) that simply is not there.  This improper use of 
the reports and lack of understanding is one of the primary reasons that SAS70 was retired in the 
first place, yet it would appear that the “new and improved” version is not working any better.  It 
is probably fair to assume that the numbers would not get better if the response rate on this 
question was higher, as some responders likely left it blank rather than admit to a lack of 
knowledge that they probably should possess, given their positions within their organizations.  
 
 
Table 29 - Knowledge of 3rd-party Service Provider Reporting 
 
 While the above observations were not the initial focus of this portion of the study, they 
do nevertheless help salvage something of value from the effort expended. 
 
 
  
Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
0 93 45.8 83.8
1 18 8.9 16.2
Total 111 54.7 100.0
Missing System 92 45.3
203 100.0
Valid
Total
Survey Question 7 (KNOW)
  
110 
 
Chapter V 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The primary goals of this study were: to identify anomalies in reported breach data that 
could be exploited to the benefit of auditors, and to empirically establish that reported breach 
frequency varies significantly between various pairings of breach type and organization type.  
This information could greatly assist auditors in the risk assessment portion of their engagement 
planning, as the engagement resources can be focused on addressing those breach events more 
likely to occur, based on the type of organization under review.  An additional objective is to 
identify factors that affect the decisions of CIOs regarding their consideration of whether to 
employ cloud/datacenter-hosted solutions and examine their level of awareness regarding the 
different assurance levels offered by these various third-party service provider audit reports.   
Ultimately, the research sought to answer these questions: 
1. Are there any significant anomalies in reported breach data that could be used to 
benefit auditors? 
2. If type of organization is significantly associated with type of breach, which 
organization types are most vulnerable to which types of breaches? 
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3. Do any of the following influence CIOs when making outsourcing (cloud) decisions?  
 
Prior breach experience 
Level of importance placed on audit certification 
Level of personal knowledge of assurance levels  
 
The research has shown that anomalies definitely do exist that could prove useful to 
auditors and systems designers.  Looking strictly at types of breaches, three of the eight breach 
types (DISK, HACK & PORT) comprise 65% of the total breaches reported.  Consequently, 
lacking any other information upon which to base their decision, auditors should apply an 
appropriate percentage of their breach detection and/or prevention resources to these three breach 
types.  The analysis strictly by organization type was equally enlightening, indicating that three 
of the seven (EDU, GOV & MED) organization types account for over 60% of total reported 
breaches.  Again, sans better information, auditors should expend a larger percentage of their 
resources in the detection and/or prevention of breaches when auditing organizations that fit into 
one of these three categories.  One caveat that should be considered here is that many entities 
included in organization types EDU, GOV and MED are also non-profit entities.  In the overall 
analysis of breaches by organization type, nonprofit organizations (NGO) accounted for only 
2.4% of the total breaches.  However, considering that a large portion of EDU, GOV and MED 
entities are also NGO entities, the data would indicate that nonprofit organizations report roughly 
two-thirds of all breaches reported.  It is quite possible that this is indicative of an underlying 
unrelated factor, such as: perhaps for-profit entities are underreporting their breaches, or perhaps 
they have better controls.  Either way, there are very clear trends in breaches noted over the 
study period.   
A statistically significant relationship was established between the type of breach and the 
type of organization reporting those breaches.  This information could prove quite useful to 
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auditors when planning and conducting their examinations.  Unfortunately, there were no factors 
identified that influence the decisions of IT directors regarding the consumption of distributed 
network/cloud services.  This was not due to failure to find statistical significance, but rather is a 
remnant of such a poor survey response as to render this part of the study un-testable.  There 
were, however, a number of observations made from the frequency analysis of the small data 
sample that may indicate areas ripe for future research. 
It is important to keep an open mind when considering a foray into the cloud computing 
environment, and maintaining a healthy skepticism will likely serve any CIO well.  The 
marketing hype that extols the virtues of the cloud and all its possibilities is to be expected.  
However, this spin has been enjoined by the mainstream media to the point that anti-cloud 
sentiment is not nearly as widely published or available.  Much of this research project has 
elucidated that there are still serious concerns with the cloud – particularly in the area of security.  
However, CIOs should also recognize that some of the most important promises of the cloud 
may not materialize.  Cost savings, for example, is one of the most widely touted reasons for 
outsourcing services into the cloud.  Most of the articles written on the subject make a claim of 
some sort based on cost savings.  Yet very recent reports warn users that this just simply is not 
always true because the implementation and operation of cloud services can become extremely 
complex and pricing models can be extremely convoluted.  An article in the March 6, 2012 
journal CFO explains how an Australian company considering replacing an aging enterprise 
system came to the conclusion that a SaaS solution would cost between 135% and 280% more 
than purchasing an on-premises replacement system, due to the added complexities and the 
unanticipated “per transaction” costs that the SaaS contract included.  The author warns readers 
to: "Just make sure that when you launch your own cloud initiative, the driver is not enthusiasm 
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for the technology but a deep knowledge of your own business requirements" (Livingstone, 
2012). 
For any readers who still doubt the dangers lurking in the cloud for the unwary, the 
following example may sway their position.  The Washington Post reported on April 2, 2012 on 
a security breach that may have compromised millions of debit and credit cards.  The article 
states that Mastercard and Visa were trying to determine the extent of a breach at an Atlanta-
based payment processing company that describes itself as “one of the world’s largest electronic 
transaction processing companies.”  In the cloud, as in real estate, caveat emptor is the rule, not 
the exception. 
 
Contributions of the Research 
 
 
This research identified factors common to data breaches and the organizations that 
report them.  As such, it provides opportunities for auditors to focus their examination of data 
breaches performed in an audit, based on the organization type.  This allows critical resources to 
be deployed where they are statistically most likely to be effective in preventing and/or detecting 
data breaches.  Numerous parties will benefit from this research, namely: 1) CPA firms that 
provide security-related attest services to third-party service provider organizations, as they will 
have opportunities to plan and conduct their audits more efficiently and effectively, 2) third-party 
service provider companies (those that consume SAS70/SSAE16/SOC audit services), as they 
may see a reduction in their breach frequency, thereby enhancing their image and the value of 
their services; their audits may also be more efficient and therefore less costly,  3) CPA firms 
that audit cloud consumer organizations, because their external auditors can place more reliance 
on the work of the service organization auditor, and finally, 4) the cloud services consumer 
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organizations, as they may experience lower audit fees through efficiencies recognized in 3) 
above.  All of this may also promote enhanced trust in cloud systems and therefore, growth of 
the industry.  The ultimate contribution of this research is that it provides additional tools to 
regulators and auditors, which they can use in the fight against the ever-growing problems 
associated with data breaches – i.e., identity theft, financial fraud, etc.   
Armed with the findings from this study, auditors can better focus their efforts.  For 
example, when auditing a nonprofit organization, much greater emphasis should be placed on 
confirmation of proper procedures and controls related to laptops and other portable devices.  
This single breach type accounts for: more than 20% of reported breaches for educational 
institutions, almost 28% for Government/Military organizations, fully 38.3 % for Medical 
organizations, and 43.1% for entities classified in the nonprofit category.  Clearly, auditors need 
to more closely examine the policies and procedures related to laptops and portable devices, and 
perhaps even address the proper education of personnel as to those policies and procedures and 
their importance to the organization. 
Governmental agencies and educational institutions also stand to gain considerably from 
this research, as they too are frequent victims of data breaches and suffer the associated 
economic penalties. 
Another contribution of this research is in the impact it may have on the cloud services 
industry as a whole.  Identification of factors that influence the decisions of IT directors is the 
first step in addressing their concerns.  While the current project was unable to definitively 
identify such factors, the frequency analyses of the survey data did provide some interesting 
observations that will guide future research in this area.  Once relevant factors are specifically 
identified, future assurance services can be targeted toward addressing the associated concerns, 
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thereby enhancing the growth of the cloud services industry overall.  Finally, the conceptual 
model that was developed will be useful in future research designed to isolate and quantify those 
factors that influence IT directors in their decisions to consume cloud-related services. 
 
Future Research 
 
 
 Both cloud services and data breaches are areas with great potential for future research.  
This is true not only because of the recent popularity of these areas, but also due to their large 
growth projections.    This study suggests several avenues of future research that might prove 
interesting.  One observation from the data is that the trend in breaches was steadily downward 
from 2006-2009, then turned upward.  Further analysis in this area might reveal causal factors 
for this phenomenon.  The ability to identify factors that drive breach frequency would be quite 
valuable in the development of tools to help combat the problem.   Another area of investigation 
that might prove interesting is the relationship between the number of records breached and the 
number of breaches.  Does the loss potential associated with a breach truly depend on the 
number of records breached, as current thinking suggests, or are there other factors that play a 
more important role?  Perhaps some other factors that could be more easily manipulated, and 
therefore provide greater opportunities for minimizing the economic effect of breaches that 
occur?  Since this study identifies trends over time based on breach type, it might prove useful to 
also examine the impact of well-known malware outbreaks and other such widespread web-
based attacks on the observed trends.  The current study identified factors that account for some 
of the variability in reported breaches.  Future studies of a more predictive nature may contribute 
greatly to the knowledge in this area, while also aiding in efforts to control the problem. 
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The survey portion of this study attempted to address important questions that need to be 
answered in order to enhance the data security provided by 3rd-party service providers.  While 
the survey results did not provide specific guidance, these questions still need to be answered, 
and there were still some good observations.  Future studies should attempt to answer the 
questions posed in this section perhaps through other means.  In the “remarks” section of the 
survey, numerous respondents expressed that in their opinion, SurveyMonkey™ or a similar 
survey tool would be a much better methodology for conducting a survey of this nature.  Some 
went to the trouble to respond just to offer this suggestion, without bothering to participate in the 
study by completing the survey.  A future study might replicate the current study using such a 
tool and perhaps would enjoy a much improved response rate.  Other data that was included in 
the survey email list that was purchased, such as industry type might also prove useful in future 
research.  A comparison of the breach data from the first section of the current study with the 
responses by NAICS code might provide some clues as to why some of the trends in breaches by 
type and industry exist. 
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Appendix 1 – Survey Instrument 
 
 
Hello. 
 
My name is Eric Sims. I am conducting research that attempts 
to identify factors that could make data more secure in a 
cloud computing environment. 
 
Successful completion of this project may benefit the entire 
distributed-computing world (and will also help me obtain my PhD). 
  
Would you please take a moment to help with this important research 
and become a valuable contributor to the solution? 
 
To participate, simply "reply" to this email and type an "X" (or 
the year, where appropriate) into the blanks by your answers. If you 
prefer not to participate, simply delete this email. Either way, I 
thank you very much for your time. 
 
 
 
            CLOUD-BASED SERVICES SURVEY 
 
1. Does your company consume any cloud-based services? 
 
         ___Yes___No 
 
2. If yes, please specify which cloud-based services you employ 
    by indicating what year you implemented them. 
 
   APPLICATION (Indicate Year Deployed) 
 
     Monitoring______________________ 
     Content________________________ 
     Collaboration____________________ 
     Communication__________________ 
     Finance________________________ 
 
   PLATFORM (Indicate Year Deployed) 
 
     Object Storage___________________ 
     Identity_________________________ 
     Runtime________________________ 
     Queue_________________________ 
     Database_______________________ 
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   INFRASTRUCTURE (Indicate Year Deployed) 
 
     Compute_______________________ 
     Block Storage___________________ 
     Network________________________ 
 
3. Are your current cloud service provider’s data handling 
    procedures audited by a CPA? 
 
         ___Yes___No___Unknown 
 
       If yes, what type of report was issued? 
 
         ___SAS70/SSAE16 
         ___AICPA SOC report: ___Type 1 ___Type 2 ___Type 3 
         ___Unknown 
 
4. Have you ever experienced a data breach with any: 
 
     a. Non-SAS70/SSAE16/SOC datacenter-hosted systems? 
 
         ___Yes___No 
 
     b. SAS70/SSAE16/SOC datacenter-hosted systems? 
 
         ___Yes___No 
  
5. If either 4a or 4b is yes, are you still willing to host 
    your critical business functions in the cloud? 
 
         ___Yes___No 
 
         Why or why not? 
 
 
6. How important is SAS70/SSAE16/SOC certification to your decision? 
 
                (Please place an X on the line below) 
 
         Not at all Important 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9 Critical 
 
7. Are you familiar with the differences in the assurance provided 
    by SOC Type 2 and Type 3 reports versus SAS70/SSAE16/SOC-Type 1 reports? 
 
         ___Yes___No 
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Any additional comments regarding your experience with or thoughts on 
data security in a cloud environment would be greatly appreciated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for your participation in this research study. 
 
 
This study has been reviewed by The University of Mississippi’s  
Institutional Review Board (IRB).  The IRB has determined that this study  
fulfills the human research subject protections obligations required by state  
and federal law and University policies.  If you have any questions, concerns,  
or reports regarding your rights as a participant of research, please contact  
the IRB at (662) 915-7482. 
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Appendix 2 – IRB Approval 
 
 
Figure 19 - IRB Approval 
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Appendix 3 – Monthly Data 
 
 
 
 
Table 30 – Breaches by Type by Month 
 
  
DISC HACK CARD INSD PHYS PORT STAT UNKN
Jan 49      42      5        30      36      75      19      11      267    
Feb 46      36      6        27      24      41      15      4        199    
Mar 37      51      7        34      25      69      15      7        245    
Apr 42      51      3        29      33      67      14      4        243    
May 34      53      6        27      33      58      13      9        233    
Jun 52      54      1        24      33      67      16      12      259    
Jul 46      46      2        27      32      71      9        6        239    
Aug 40      47      4        22      38      78      17      11      257    
Sep 38      39      3        29      27      62      20      3        221    
Oct 40      26      1        14      32      85      17      9        224    
Nov 39      33      3        27      24      58      20      6        210    
Dec 42      56      0        26      32      74      16      4        250    
505    534    41      316    369    805    191    86      2,847 
MONTH * BRCH_TYP Crosstabulation
Count
BRCH_TYP
Total
MONTH
Total
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Appendix 4 – Annual Data 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 31 - Breaches by Type by Year 
  
DISC HACK CARD INSD PHYS PORT STAT UNKN
2005 20      48      0        10      8        38      10      2        136    
2006 83      75      3        32      39      186    48      16      482    
2007 98      71      2        23      43      163    36      16      452    
2008 79      57      5        31      53      99      22      9        355    
2009 53      53      4        30      38      61      10      4        253    
2010 97      97      13      104    103    142    37      12      605    
2011 75      133    14      86      85      116    28      27      564    
505    534    41      316    369    805    191    86      2,847 
YEAR
Total
YEAR * BRCH_TYP Crosstabulation
Count
BRCH_TYP
Total
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Appendix 5 – Breach Type by Org Type Data 
 
 
 
Table 32 - Breach Type by Organization Type 
 
  
BSO BSF BSR EDU GOV MED NGO
DISC 49      50      30      166    142    63      5        505    
HACK 92      66      109    175    52      28      12      534    
CARD 2        17      22      0        0        0        0        41      
INSD 38      64      41      14      59      96      4        316    
PHYS 37      46      27      46      89      116    8        369    
PORT 104    125    49      118    145    236    28      805    
STAT 20      23      11      47      21      64      5        191    
UNKN 12      21      9        12      16      13      3        86      
354    412    298    578    524    616    65      2,847 Total
BRCH_TYP * ORG_TYP Crosstabulation
Count
ORG_TYP
Total
BRCH_
TYP
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Appendix 6 – Non-Significant Trends by Breach Type 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Breach Type "STAT" Trend
 
Figure 20 - "Stationary Device" Trend 
 
There is no noticeable trend for the “STAT” breach type, as seen in Figure 20.  Note that the Phi 
coefficient confirms the lack of significance (Phi coefficient = .190, p = .068) in Table 33.  
 
 
Table 33 – Non-significant “Stationary Device” Trend 
Value df
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 102.905 83 .068
Likelihood Ratio 110.235 83 .024
N of Valid Cases 2,847
Value
Approx. 
Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi .190 .068
Cramer's V .190 .068
2,847
Symmetric Measures
N of Valid Cases
Chi-Square Tests
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0
1
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6
Breach Type "UNKN" Trend
 
Figure 21 - "Unknown" Trend 
 
As is the case with the “STAT” breach type, there is no significant trend in the breach frequency 
in the “UNKN” category.  This is not so obvious in the graph in Figure 21, but it is confirmed by 
Table 34 (Phi coefficient = .173, p = .418). 
 
 
Table 34 - Non-significant "Unknown" Trend 
 
Value df
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 85.029 83 .418
Likelihood Ratio 97.561 83 .131
N of Valid Cases 2,847
Value
Approx. 
Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi .173 .418
Cramer's V .173 .418
2,847N of Valid Cases
Symmetric Measures
Chi-Square Tests
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Appendix 7 – Breach and Organization Frequency Data 
 
Table 35 - Supporting Data for Figure 10 
 
 
 
Table 36 - Supporting Data for Figure 11 
  
BRCH_TYP
Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
DISC 505               17.7          17.7      
HACK 534               18.8          18.8      
CARD 41                 1.4            1.4        
INSD 316               11.1          11.1      
PHYS 369               13.0          13.0      
PORT 805               28.3          28.3      
STAT 191               6.7            6.7        
UNKN 86                 3.0            3.0        
Total 2,847            100.0        100.0    
ORG_TYP
Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
BSO 354               12.4          12.4      
BSF 412               14.5          14.5      
BSR 298               10.5          10.5      
EDU 578               20.3          20.3      
GOV 524               18.4          18.4      
MED 616               21.6          21.6      
NGO 65                 2.3            2.3        
Total 2,847            100.0        100.0    
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Appendix 8 – Hypothesis 4 Supporting Tables 
 
 
Table 37 - Supporting Data for Figure 12 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 38 - Supporting Data for Figure 13 
 
Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
Valid DISC 49             13.8      13.8     
HACK 92             26.0      26.0     
CARD 2               0.6        0.6       
INSD 38             10.7      10.7     
PHYS 37             10.5      10.5     
PORT 104           29.4      29.4     
STAT 20             5.6        5.6       
UNKN 12             3.4        3.4       
Total 354           100.0    100.0   
Organization Type "Business, Other"
Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
DISC 50             12.1      12.1     
HACK 66             16.0      16.0     
CARD 17             4.1        4.1       
INSD 64             15.5      15.5     
PHYS 46             11.2      11.2     
PORT 125           30.3      30.3     
STAT 23             5.6        5.6       
UNKN 21             5.1        5.1       
Total 412           100.0    100.0   
Valid
Organization Type "Business, Financial & Insurance"
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Table 39 - Supporting Data for Figure 14 
 
 
 
 
Table 40 - Supporting Data for Figure 15 
 
 
Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
DISC 30             10.1      10.1     
HACK 109           36.6      36.6     
CARD 22             7.4        7.4       
INSD 41             13.8      13.8     
PHYS 27             9.1        9.1       
PORT 49             16.4      16.4     
STAT 11             3.7        3.7       
UNKN 9               3.0        3.0       
Total 298           100.0    100.0   
Valid
Organization Type "Business, Retail/Merchant"
Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
DISC 166           28.7      28.7     
HACK 175           30.3      30.3     
INSD 14             2.4        2.4       
PHYS 46             8.0        8.0       
PORT 118           20.4      20.4     
STAT 47             8.1        8.1       
UNKN 12             2.1        2.1       
Total 578           100.0    100.0   
Valid
Organization Type "Educational Institutions"
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Table 41 - Supporting Data for Figure 16 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 42 - Supporting Data for Figure 17 
 
 
Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
DISC 142           27.1      27.1     
HACK 52             9.9        9.9       
INSD 59             11.3      11.3     
PHYS 89             17.0      17.0     
PORT 145           27.7      27.7     
STAT 21             4.0        4.0       
UNKN 16             3.1        3.1       
Total 524           100.0    100.0   
Valid
Organization Type "Government/Military"
Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
Valid DISC 63             10.2      10.2     
HACK 28             4.5        4.5       
INSD 96             15.6      15.6     
PHYS 116           18.8      18.8     
PORT 236           38.3      38.3     
STAT 64             10.4      10.4     
UNKN 13             2.1        2.1       
Total 616           100.0    100.0   
Organization Type "Medical/Healthcare Providers"
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Table 43 - Supporting Data for Figure 18 
 
  
Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent
Valid DISC 5               7.7        7.7       
HACK 12             18.5      18.5     
INSD 4               6.2        6.2       
PHYS 8               12.3      12.3     
PORT 28             43.1      43.1     
STAT 5               7.7        7.7       
UNKN 3               4.6        4.6       
Total 65             100.0    100.0   
Organization Type "Nonprofit Organizations"
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Appendix 9 – Tables for Hypothesis 6 Testing 
 Table 44 confirms that there are only 11 observations that fit the criteria for testing of 
Hypothesis 6. 
 
Table 44 – Future Intent versus Importance Placed on Assurance Services (Hypothesis 6) 
 
Table 45 provides the Chi-square result and Table 46 presents the binary logistic regression 
result for the tests performed on this very limited sample.  No conclusions should be attributed to 
these results. 
 
Table 45 – Hypothesis 6 Chi-square Result 
 
 
 
Table 46 – Hypothesis 6 Binary Logistic Regression Result 
 
  
1 3 4 8 9
0 3 1 0 1 1 6
1 1 1 1 1 1 5
4 2 1 2 2 11Total
SQ5 * SQ6 Crosstabulation
Count
SQ6
Total
SQ5
Chi-
square df Sig.
Step .346 1 .557
Block .346 1 .557
Model .346 1 .557
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Step 1
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
SQ6 .109 .188 .339 1 .560 1.115
Constant -.664 1.035 .411 1 .521 .515
Variables in the Equation
Step 1
a
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: SQ6.
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Appendix 10 – Tables for Hypothesis 7 Testing 
Table 47 indicates that only 12 observations were available for testing of Hypothesis 7. 
 
Table 47 – Future Intent versus Assurance Knowledge Level (Hypothesis 7) 
 
Table 48 provides the Chi-square result and Table 49 presents the binary logistic regression 
result for the tests performed on this very limited sample.  No conclusions should be attributed to 
these results. 
 
Table 48 – Hypothesis 7 Chi-square Result 
 
 
 
Table 49 – Hypothesis 7 Binary Logistic Regression Result 
 
0 1
0 4 2 6
1 3 3 6
7 5 12Total
SQ5 * SQ7 Crosstabulation
Count
SQ7
Total
SQ5
Chi-
square df Sig.
Step .345 1 .557
Block .345 1 .557
Model .345 1 .557
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Step 1
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
SQ7 .693 1.190 .339 1 .560 2.000
Constant -.288 .764 .142 1 .706 .750
Variables in the Equation
Step 1
a
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: SQ7.
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